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During recent decades, corporate governance (CG) topics have attracted attention around the world 
(Ahrens, Filatotchev, & Thomsen, 2011), including whether CG impacts firm financial performance, a 
question remains unanswered. Therefore, this study examines the influence of CG features, including 
board and ownership structures, on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed 
firms. The study employs fundamental features of CG such as board size, board gender diversity, board 
independence, board duality, insider ownership, and blockholder ownership to analyse their likely 
effects on the financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q.  
The study uses a panel data of 412 Vietnamese non-financial listed firms during 2010-2015, and 
employs multiple estimation methods, including the System-GMM estimator to control for the 
endogeneity issue, and the ordinary least square (OLS) and fixed effects (FE) estimators for comparison 
purposes.  
The study result shows that except for board size and board gender diversity, which have no effect on 
the firms’ performance, the other governance attributes do impact the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. Specifically, board independence and board duality negatively 
influence the firms’ performance. The relationship between insider ownership and the firms’ 
performance is an inverted U-shaped form. When insider ownership is less than 30%, insider 
ownership positively influences the firms’ performance. As the proportion of insiders’ shares is above 
30%, thus insider ownership negatively affects the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms. Meanwhile, ownership concentration and the firms’ financial performance form a cubic 
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relationship. At a low level (less than 25%) and a high level (more than 61%) of ownership 
concentration, the firms’ financial performance is positively related to ownership concentration. 
However, at the middle level (from 25% to 61%) of ownership concentration, the financial performance 
is negatively related to ownership concentration. The study results support the argument that there is 
no “one size fits all” governance mechanism, and help to enrich the understandings of the corporate 
governance - firm financial performance relationship in developing countries such as Vietnam.  
Keywords: board structure, ownership structure, financial performance, corporate governance, 
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1.1 Background of the study 
In recent decades, corporate governance (CG) topics have received increasingly substantial attention 
around the world (Ahrens, Filatotchev, & Thomsen, 2011). According to Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013), 
the growing attention to CG issues is due to a series of financial crises. During the past 20 years, the 
world has observed the disastrous consequences of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global 
financial crisis. One of the underlying causes of these crises is the failure of existing CG systems across 
countries (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Following the aftershock of the financial crises, scholars, 
policymakers, and businesses all around the world have recognised the possible long-lasting severe 
outcomes of weakly-governed systems challenging their macro economies and business world 
(Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).   
CG is derived from and regarded as a solution for the “agency problem”. In the classic work, namely 
“The Modern Corporations and Private Properties”, Berle & Means (1932) state that the “agency 
problem” is “a consequence of the separation of ownership and control” in the dispersed ownership 
structure, in which the “conflict of interests” happens between managers who are in control of the 
firm and stockholders who invest in the firm but they are unable to supervise its daily operations, 
leading to the likelihood that the managers prioritise their benefits over those of stockholders and 
misuse the firm’s resources. Therefore, many “internal governance mechanisms” as well as “external 
governance mechanisms”, today known as the CG mechanisms, were proposed and developed as a 
solution for mitigating agency conflicts. In other words, the primary objective of CG is to establish the 
means by which capital providers ensure that they can obtain returns for their investments and create 
the mechanisms that enable them to supervise managers (La Porta & Vishny, 1997). 
In response to the growing concern about the need for a sound CG model, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) devised a set of standards and guidelines as early as 
1999 (which became known as the Principles of CG and were further revised in 2004 and 2015) to assist 
policymakers in evaluating and comprehensively improving the law system, the rule and regulation 
system, and the institution system related to CG, hence promoting economic growth and sustainability 
and maintaining financial stability. Since then, the Principles of CG introduced by the OECD have 




Many prior studies on CG show that CG is related to firm performance. For instance, Bhagat & Bolton 
(2008), Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick (2003) and Klapper & Love (2003) state that sound CG results in an 
improvement in the financial performance of firms. This is because in better governed firms, 
shareholders and stakeholders transfer less control power to managers and the managers tend to act 
to maximize the firms’ wealth (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). From the shareholders’ perspectives, Jensen 
(1986) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Vishny (2002) further indicate that when rigorous CG 
mechanisms are in place, stockholders have more confidence in obtaining more returns from their 
investments instead of being taken away by managers.  
In emerging countries, the importance of CG as well as its link with the performance of firms has been 
highlighted. For instance, La Porta & Vishny (1997) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny 
(2000) state that CG plays a significant role in the growth of financial markets and corporate values 
across emerging countries. According to La Porta et al., (2000), one of the objectives of CG is to 
safeguard the benefits of “outside investors” from managers’ expropriation. When investors are 
protected by a good CG regime, they are more willing to invest in the firms. As a result, it becomes 
easier for firms to mobilise capital either in the form of issuing shares or bonds. Therefore, ensuring 
the interests of investors (including both shareholders and creditors) will help firms with capital 
mobilisation and facilitate the growth of both the stock market and the credit market. Likewise, La 
Porta & Vishny (1997) indicate that countries with a high degree of investor protection will enjoy 
greater development of the equity market in terms of market capitalisation and the frequency of initial 
public offering (IPO) than countries with a low degree of investor protection. La Porta et al., (2000) 
also emphasise the significance of many reforms in CG mechanisms throughout emerging countries 
from Asia to Latin America and Eastern Europe, where the benefits of these reforms include expanding 
the financial markets, facilitating the provision of outside capital for establishing new firms, reducing 
ownership concentration, and promoting the efficient capital distribution. Klapper & Love (2003) state 
that firms may obtain a partial compensation for an inefficient judicial framework and its 
implementation by setting up sound CG mechanisms. Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013) in the most recent 
review on CG in emerging countries find that improved CG systems bring firms more available financial 
resources, lesser capital mobilisation costs, and better arrangements in treating all stakeholders. 
1.2 Corporate governance in Vietnam 
Although the importance of CG is widely recognized, according to the World Bank (2007), Vietnam is 
at an early developmental stage in terms of implementing good CG practices. 
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1.2.1 Corporate governance regulatory framework in Vietnam 
The CG framework in Vietnam encompasses the following documents: (i) Enterprise Law promulgated 
in 2005, (ii) Securities Law enacted in 2006, (iii) CG Ordinance issued in 2007 applied to listed firms, 
and (iv) Disclosure and Listing Rules of the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) and the Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange (HSX). In this framework, Enterprise Law has been regarded as the most fundamental 
regulatory foundation for the setting up and development of CG standards and practices (Bui & Nunoi, 
2008). Enterprise Law 2005 stipulates the mandatory internal CG mechanisms of a joint-stock firm 
which include four major components: (i) shareholders’ meetings, (ii) Board of directors (BODs), (iii) 
CEOs, and (iv) Supervisory Board (or Board of Supervisors). The shareholders’ meeting is the most 
powerful authority in the management of a joint-stock firm where the most important decision-making 
is discussed and voted on. Shareholding firms in Vietnam follow a dual board structure in which top 
managerment is simultaneously undertaken by both the BODs and board of supervisors. The BODs 
plays an essential role as a supreme body and representative of all shareholders of a firm. The 
appointment of board members is determined in the shareholders’ meetings.1 The BODs is authorized 
to monitor and discipline the CEOs. The number of board directors is at least three but not over 
eleven2. To enhance sound governance practices, firms can appoint non-executive independent 
members to the board. The supervisory board, also elected by shareholders, is authorized to supervise 
both the CEOs and BODs. The supervisory board functions include monitoring the performance of 
CEOs, assessing financial reports, overseeing the information disclosure and communication of the 
firm, and other oversight roles. Enterprise Law assures supervisory board members of having sufficient 
information on management activities of the firm. For instance, supervisory board members can be 
present in BODs meetings as well as receive reports of CEOs which are concurrently submitted to the 
BODs.  
In 2014, the Enterprise Law 2005 was revised. The revised Enterprise Law, which has come into effect 
since the 1st of July 2015, is aimed at promoting the independence of the BODs, reducing the conflict 
of interests, and improving the accountability as part of the Vietnam government’s drive to enhance 
sound CG practices (IFC, 2015). 
Based on Enterprise Law 2005 and the OECD Principles of CG, the Finance Ministry of Vietnam issued 
the CG Ordinance in 2007 which requires all listed firms to comply with good CG practices with a view 
to improving CG mechanisms, thereby “ensuring the stability of the financial market and increasing 
the transparency of the economy”3. The Ordinance, revised in July 2012 and September 2017, acts as 
                                                          
1 See Enterprise Law 2005 
2 See Article 109 of Enterprise Law 2005 
3 See Decision 12/2007/QD-BTC on CG for Vietnamese listed firms issued by the Finance Ministry of Vietnam on 
13th March 2007  
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the role of a CG Code that requires all listed firms to comply with it. Accordingly, listed firms 
incorporate and develop principles and provisions contained in the Ordinance in their firms’ charters 
in implementing the good CG mechanism. The fundamental principles of CG introduced by the 
Ordinance involve principles in terms of shareholders’ rights, shareholders’ meetings, BODs, board of 
supervisors, the conflict of interests and transactions of related parties, and information 
announcements and transparency4. 
1.2.2 Corporate governance context in Vietnam 
Vietnam is a country with high ownership concentration characterised by the high state ownership. 
According to the World Bank (2013b), at the end of 2012, 355 listed firms reported having state 
ownership, of which 244 listed firms have from a 25% state ownership proportion. 
The state continues to play a dominant role. For example, the state dominates “a number of key 
sectors, with estimated revenue shares of 91 percent in telecommunications, 99 percent in coal, 94 
percent in electricity, 51 percent in cement, 26 percent in construction and chemicals, and 21 percent 
in textiles” (World Bank, 2013b, p.15). 
Although the Vietnam government has made significant efforts to effectively implement sound CG 
mechanisms, CG practices in Vietnam are still underdeveloped. According to the World Bank (2013a), 
Vietnam is ranked 169th among 185 countries in terms of protecting investors’ rights. In another report 
conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2014 based on the scorecard method, the average 
CG scores of Vietnam in 2012 and 2013 were 28.42% and 33.87%, respectively (see Figure 1.1). 
Notably, Vietnam’s scores are the lowest among the South East Asian countries surveyed, and the gap 
in these scores between Vietnam and the rest is considerable. Transparency, protection of minority 
shareholders, and board professionalism and effectiveness are among the weaknesses of CG practices 
in Vietnam (World Bank, 2013b). Recently, Vietnam has suffered several corporate financial scandals 
in high profile state owned enterprises and listed firms such as Vinashin Corporation (a leading state-
owned enterprise in the ship-building industry) and Asia Commercial Bank and Ocean Bank (listed 
firms), which shook the confidence of domestic and foreign investors and had unexpected impacts on 
the sustainable development of the securities market and the ongoing equitisation process of state 
owned enterprises in Vietnam. Therefore, in the era of global integration accompanied by increased 
international competition, the question of designing appropriate policies in order to improve the CG 
                                                          
4 See Circular 121/2012-TT-BTC on CG for Vietnamese listed firms issued by the Finance Ministry of Vietnam on 




framework and practices has increasingly become a central consideration of the Vietnam government 
and related international organisations. 
 
Source: Adapted from ADB (2014). “The Asean CG Scorecard: Country Reports and Assessments 2013-
2014” 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Many corporate governance studies focus on CG and listed firm performance in developed markets 
(e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Kiel and Nichoson, 2003; Christopher, 2004; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Gill 
and Mathur, 2011).  Recently, a considerable amount of research on emerging markets has been 
conducted (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2003; Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2008; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Rouf, 2011; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). However, there is a shortage of 






























concept in Vietnam (IFC, 2011) or the data is not widely available.  In addition, Vietnam provides a 
unique environment to investigate the CG - firm performance relationship.  
First, Vietnam differs from other developing countries since it is one of the only two developing 
economies under the communist regime (China is the other) where the State continues to play a 
dominant role (World Bank, 2013b). As the State is a major controlling shareholder, it often creates 
“problems for non-controlling shareholders to properly effectuate their shareholders rights” (OECD, 
2006, p.71). In a communist developing country, such as Vietnam, characterised by the dominant 
leadership of communist party through the State power, a weak legal system and poor investor 
protection (Pham, Oh, & Pech, 2015), CG mechanisms play an essential role to address not only “the 
conflict of interests between the owners and the managers”, but also “the conflict of interests between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders” (OECD, 2006). The benefits and rights of the 
“minority shareholders” are a matter of concern of the CG system to ensure that they are protected 
from the possible expropriation of State ownership. This is a critical matter because the State is the 
owner and also the policymaker having state power. In this regard, the coexistence of high ownership 
concentration and high state ownership of a communist country such as Vietnam can provide a unique 
environment to study CG issues. 
Second, from the corporate governance perspectives, high ownership concentration with the high 
level of State ownership makes the effectiveness of BODs and their composition a critical matter. While 
the ultimate goal of ordinary shareholders is to maximise the firm’s profits, the goals of State, as an 
owner as well as a policymaker, might be different. It could be a social goal such as creating more jobs, 
or a political goal such as protecting local producers from tough foreign competitors (Phung & Mishra, 
2016). These goals of State ownership which depart from the goal of ordinary shareholders may 
influence the effectiveness of BODs in terms of maximising shareholders’ wealth. However, State 
owned firms are offered many governmental supports such as preferential loans from State banks 
(Firth et al., 2008). Moreover, political connections of State owned firms may help the firms with 
bureaucratic requirements (Phung & Mishra, 2016). Because of these favourable treatments from the 
State, firms with high State ownership have more advantages to improve their financial performance 
in comparison with other firms (Yu, 2013; Hess et al., 2010).   
Regarding the composition of BODs, unlike other countries where the members of the BODs are 
appointed by stockholders through shareholder general meetings without the interference of the 
state, in Vietnam, many listed firms transformed from State owned firms have members of BODs or 
senior managers who are approved by the State authorities (Phung & Mishra, 2016). This may 
negatively impact the monitoring function of BODs over managers because they are “on the same 
boat” (Nguyen, 2008), leading to the inefficiency of financial performance. However, the political 
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relationships may be considered as the “firm wealth” which help State owned firms outperform others 
(Phung & Mishra, 2016), especially in an environtment such as Vietnam where the practice of “ask and 
give” still exists (Freeman & Nguyen, 2006). Therefore, the high concentration of State ownership in a 
communist country such as Vietnam is a critical point to study the relationship betweeen CG and firm 
performance.     
There remain limited research in the context of Vietnam. Recently, there have been a few studies on 
the CG - firm financial performance relationship in Vietnam (e.g Adhikary & Le, 2014;  Dao & Hoang, 
2014; Nguyen et al., 2015). These studies produce mixed results and mainly focus on examining the 
impacts of board structure on the firm performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms.  
This study is the first study to systematically investigate the comprehensive relationships between 
both board structure as well as ownership structure and the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms. In addition, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effects (FE) estimators in 
prior research produce biased results as the endogeneity problems have not been fully addressed. 
Harris & Raviv (2008), Hermalin & Weisbach (2003), and Wintoki et al., (2012) suggest that financial 
performance is dynamically linked with CG, which means that past financial performance may 
influence current governance. The use of OLS and FE estimators that ignore this possible dynamic 
characteristic of the CG - performance relationship leads to endogeneity problems. Wintoki et al., 
(2012) suggest that the System Generalised Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) is the most appropriate 
estimator to examine the CG – firm performance relationship because it can fully address the 
endogeneity problem by employing internal instruments in the panel in a dynamic framework.   
This study employs the SYS-GMM estimator to investigate the association between the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms and key determinants of CG including both board 
structre and ownership structure, namely board size, board gender diversity, board independence, 
board duality, insider ownership, and ownership concentration. This study attempts to bridge the gaps 
in prior studies and provides a more comprehensive investigation on the CG - financial performance 
relationship of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
The present research aims to investigate the relationship between CG and non-financial listed firms’ 
financial performance in Vietnam. The research objectives include: 
(i) To identify the impact of board size on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms; 
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(ii) To analyse the relationship between board gender diversity and the financial 
performance of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam; 
(iii) To determine the effect of board independence on the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms; 
(iv) To assess the impact of board duality on non-financial listed firms’ financial 
performance in Vietnam;  
(v) To identify the influence of insider ownership on the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms;  
(vi) To study the impact of ownership concentration on non-financial listed firms’ financial 
performance in Vietnam;   
1.5 Significance of the study 
Firstly, motivated by the recent heightened focus of CG in Vietnam and the shortage of research on 
this issue, the present study attempts to provide a strong understanding of the CG practices of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, thereby assisting policymakers, regulators, non-financial listed 
firms and all kinds of stakeholders in an attempt to promote the implementation of good CG standards 
and practices in Vietnam. 
Second, this study bridges the gaps in prior studies by using the SYS-GMM estimator which effectively 
addresses the problem of endogeneity in a large sample of 412 non-financial listed firms on the HSX 
and the HNX in 2010-2015, thereby providing more reliable and comprehensive results.  
Finally, this study contributes to the growing CG literature by examining the impact of CG on non-
financial firms’ performance under the unique environment in Vietnam, where high ownership 
concentration coexists with high state ownership. 
1.6 Structure of the study 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two summarises reviews of the relevant literature on CG 
and its relationship with firm financial performance. It introduces the definitions and theoretical bases 
of CG and then it discusses the CG - firm financial performance association in the literature. Building 
on the literature review, Chapter Two also develops the research hypotheses on the relationship 
between CG and the financial performance of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. Chapter Three 
presents the data collection, definitions of variables, the endogeneity and dynamic relationship 
between CG and firm financial performance, and the empirical estimation methods used in the study 
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to investigate the CG - financial performance link of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. Chapter Four 
reports the empirical results and findings. Chapter Five presents the conclusions, including the main 





Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Section 2.1 provides the definitions of CG. Section 2.2 discusses the overview of fundamental theories 
of CG from different perspectives such as “agency theory”, “stakeholder theory”, “resource 
dependence theory”, and “stewardship theory”. Section 2.3 reviews the empirical findings of the 
linkage between CG and firm performance and presents the research hypotheses development. 
Section 2.4 summarizes the chapter. 
2.1 Definition of corporate governance 
The definitions of CG vary widely. According to Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013), CG definitions might be 
classified into two categories. Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013, p.3) suggest that “the first set of definitions 
concerns itself with a set of behavioural patterns: the actual behaviour of corporations, in terms of 
such measures as performance, efficiency, growth, financial structure, and treatment of shareholders 
and other stakeholders. The second set concerns itself with the normative framework: that is, the rules 
under which firms are operating - with the rules coming from such sources as the legal system, the 
judicial system, financial markets, and factor (labour) markets.” 
Using the first set of definitions of CG, termed as the “narrow approach”, Shleifer & Vishny (1997, 
p.737) define CG as the means by which capital providers ensure that they can obtain their 
investment’s returns, prevent managers from misusing the resources of firms in projects that depart 
from maximising shareholders’ values, and create the mechanisms that enable capital providers to 
monitor managers. In a similar vein, Sternberg (1998) provides a definition in favour of the 
shareholders’ perspective describing CG as ways of ascertaining that the entire firm resources are 
properly utilised in achieving the corporate goals set by the shareholders. Likewise, Monks & Minow 
(1995) define CG narrowly as the relationship between participants, such as CEOs, managers, 
stockholders, and employees, in setting the firms’ objectives and performance.  
The Cadbury Report (1992) introduces a neutral definition of CG, highlighting the important roles of 
shareholders and the BODs. It defines CG as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders' role in companies is to appoint the directors and auditors and satisfy themselves that an 
appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the 
companies’ strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions 
are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting” (Cadbury Report 1992, p.14). 
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A broader definition considers a CG system as “the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post 
bargaining over the quasi rents generated by the firm” (Zingales, 1998, p.499). The definition of CG 
provided by Zingales describes the complexity and the significance of the CG system in terms of 
determining the profits (quasi-rents) and allocating the profits among the stakeholders of the firms. 
The OECD Principles of CG (2004) provide the following very broad definition which is considered as a 
basis for all OECD countries: “Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. The presence of an effective 
corporate governance system, within an individual company and across an economy as a whole, helps 
to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for proper functioning of a market economy. As a 
result, the cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use resources more efficiently, thereby 
underpinning growth.” (OECD 2004, p.11).  
This present study follows the definition of CG proposed by the OECD. This is because the study aims 
to examine the CG - financial performance relationship of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam where 
the definition and the best practices of CG introduced by the OECD have been incorporated into the 
current Vietnamese regulatory framework on CG which is followed by all publicly listed firms. 
2.2 Fundamental corporate governance theories 
This section briefly introduces the fundamental theories of CG, through which CG is reviewed in various 
perspectives. The present study follows the view that good CG, especially when approached in a broad 
manner, is difficult to be comprehensively explained by a single theory and thus, the combination of 
different theories may be relevant to describe good CG practices.  
2.2.1 Agency theory 
“Agency theory” might be viewed as one of the most fundamental theories to explore the insights of 
CG. The foundation of “agency theory” was initiated by the classic publication of Berle & Means (1932, 
p.117), namely "The Modern Corporation and Private Property", in which the authors state that where 
“ownership is widely dispersed”, as the consequence of the “separation of ownership and control”, 
managers of the firms tend to seek their personal objectives instead of maximising shareholders’ 
benefits. Jensen & Meckling (1976) further developed this viewpoint of Berle & Means (1932) into 
“Agency Theory” as it is known today. 
In the renowned article published in 1976, namely “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure”, Jensen & Meckling (1976, p.308) define the “agency relationship as a 
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contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engages another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent”. The problem which arises from the dispersed ownership is that, unlike the managers (the 
agents) who manage the daily operations of the firm, the owners (the principals) are not always there 
to follow these daily operations, which results in the likelihood that the managers take advantage of 
being in control of the firm to prioritise their own interests over maximising shareholders’ values 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
As a consequence, the owner will have to incur “agency costs”, which are described by Jensen & 
Meckling (1976, p.308) as “the sum of (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding 
expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual loss”. The “monitoring costs” are the expenditures by 
“the principal” in establishing incentives as well as monitoring systems to direct the actions of “the 
agent” for the purpose of maximising “the principal’s value”.  The “bonding costs” are the expenditures 
by “the agent” to follow the established mornitoring system. “Residual losses” are some agency losses 
as “the consequence of the conflict of interests” between the “principal” and “agent” even after 
monitoring and bonding (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
“Agency theory” focusses on “the monitoring function” of the BODs in a CG mechanism. According to 
“agency theory”, the BODs is considered as a key “monitoring device”, playing a very important role in 
eliminating the problems arising from the “agency relationship” (Mallin, Mullineux, & Wihlborg, 2005). 
Tricker (1984) recognises the significance of the board in supervising managers’ actions and 
emphasises the importance of the chairman - CEO relationship. As for the roles of the chairperson and 
CEO, Williamson (1985) and Fama & Jensen (1983) further posit that the protection of the owners’ 
interests can only be ensured where the positions between the chairman and CEO are divided, or 
where the CEO’s interests are aligned with the stockholders’ interests which can be achieved by setting 
up appropriate incentive compensation schemes.  
“Agency theory” mainly focuses on stockholders, BODs and managers of the firm. Meanwhile, other 
participants in the operations of a firm such as employees, suppliers, buyers or customers, or the 
environment5 are not accounted for.  A remedy for the agency theory that takes into account these 
shortcomings is named the stakeholder theory.  
                                                          
5 Freeman (1984) views stakeholders as groups and organizations impacted by or which impact the operation of 
the firm. Stakeholders consist of shareholders, employees, customers, local communities, government agencies and 
officials, and the environment. The managers should balance the interests of all stakeholders. Therefore, they 




2.2.2 Stakeholder theory 
“Stakeholder theory” was initiated by Freeman (1984) which suggests that a CG mechanism should 
ensure “protection of the interests of all stakeholders” of the firm. In other words, a governance 
system should safeguard not only stockholders’ interests as supported by the agency theory, but also 
other direct interests as well as indirect interests. For example, shareholders, employees, customers 
and suppliers are among the stakeholders who have direct interests in a firm because they are directly 
impacted by or impact the operation of the firm. Firms cannot survive without the ongoing 
contribution of this group of stakeholders. Stakeholders having indirect interests in a firm may include 
related firms, media and other various interest groups who establish an indirect relation with the firm. 
They may be indirectly impacted by or influence the operation of the firm, but their participation is not 
crucial to the firm’s survival since they have no business transactions with the firm (Wheeler & Maria, 
1997). 
According to Rodriguez, Ricart, & Sanchez (2002), stakeholders can be classified into three categories 
as “consubstantial, contractual and contextual stakeholders”. “Consubstantial stakeholders” are 
described as stakeholders who determine the survival of a firm. They may be stockholders, employees, 
and strategic partners. “Contractual stakeholders” are regarded as stakeholders having several types 
of official contracts with the firm. They may include suppliers, buyers or customers, and financial 
institutions. Meanwhile, “contextual stakeholders” can be undestood widely as the social, economic 
and political environments or people and organisations surrounding and relating to the firm’s 
operation. Thus, related government agencies and officials, local communities and societies, and the 
environment where the firm operates are among the “contextual stakeholders” of the firm.  
March & Simon (1958), among others, indicate that each group of stakeholders can contribute to 
providing particular resources to the firm. In return, each group also has expectations towards the firm 
in protecting the group’s interests. Friedman & Miles (2006) indicate that the firm can be regarded as 
“a grouping of stakeholders”. The goals of the firm are to manage the interests, requirements, and 
viewpoints of these groups of stakeholders, built on moral principles.   
The authors further indicate that the managers of the firm play an important role in managing 
stakeholders’ interests. The managers should run the firm in the ways that guarantee the rights and 
decision-making participation of every group of stakeholders. In addition, the managers should also 
serve as “the agents of the shareholders” in order to ensure that the firm will survive, and the long-
term stakes of every group will be protected. 
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2.2.3 Resource dependence theory 
Developed in the late 1970s by Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), “resource dependence theory” focusses on 
the important role played by “non-executive directors”. This theory suggests that the participation of 
“non-executives” on the BODs may contribute to providing critical resources to the firm.  
According to “resource dependence theory”, the BODs is considered as “the provider of diversified 
resources” to the firm, which is referred to by Hilman & Dalziel (2003) as the “board capital”. Board 
capital, according to Hilman & Dalziel (2003, p.383), can be in the form of “human capital (experience, 
expertise, reputation) and relational capital (network of ties to other firms and external contigencies)”. 
For example, non-executives on the board can provide the CEO with occupational expertise and useful 
suggestions to help the CEOs to fomulate and implement the firm’s development strategies. 
Furthermore, they may also help the firm to access external resources that enable the CEOs to control 
uncertainties more efficiently. Non-executive directors may help a firm to access financial sources 
(Thompson & McEwen, 1958). For example, a firm which borrows money from banks may opt for 
appointing an official of a bank as the firm’s non-executive director to help arrange and facilitate the 
firm’s access to funds from banks. Therefore, non-executive directors might contribute in a number of 
ways to a firm, from their expertise to their individual networks and financial sources, and thereby 
improving the firm’s performance (Hilman & Dalziel, 2003).  
2.2.4 Stewardship theory 
“Stewardship theory” was initiated by Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson (1997, p.25). In their paper, the 
authors suggest that “a steward protects and maximises shareholders’ wealth through firm 
performance, because by so doing, the steward’s utility functions are maximised”. Under this 
viewpoint, “stewards” are the managers and executives of the firm and they act towards the interests 
of stockholders. This is because the stewards integrate their objectives with the objectives of the firm 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
Stewardship theory pays attention to the motivation forms of executives and managers, which are 
developed by organizational theory. Managers are considered as faithful and committed to the firm, 
and keen on gaining great performance. The managers’ aspiration towards having an excellent 
performance is the main drive which induces them to attempt to get their job accomplished (Davis et 
al., 1997). According to McClelland (1961) and Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman (1959), there are 
incentives in the non-financial form for managers. For example, managers are motivated by attaining 
their satisfaction through hard work, fulfilling their responsibility with shareholders, and hence 
achieving appreciation and acknowledgement from their colleagues and bosses. Similarly, Daily, 
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Dalton, & Cannella (2003) posit that the incentive for executives and managers to maximise their firms’ 
performance and stockholders’ values is to protect their reputation.  
In addition, the theory supports the combination of the chairperson and CEO. According to Donaldson 
& Davis (1991), the combination of the chairman and CEO will help decrease “agency costs” as well as 
improve the significant role of stewards. Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell (1997) further explain that the cost 
of spliting the roles of the chaiman and CEO might outweigh the benefits. Given the separation of the 
chairman and CEO, there will be information sharing costs between them and also incentive costs that 
are connected with the succession processes through which the CEO is promised the chairperson 
position. Moreover, when the CEO compensation is associated with the firm’s wealth, this may cause 
the CEO to avoid risks, which can be a cost in some cases (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). If the chairman is 
also the CEO, then the firm does not have to pay more to hire a CEO from outside the board. In 
addition, CEO duality “creates a unity at the top of the organization”, which is more efficient to reach 
the goal of “profit maximization” within the organizations (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
2.3 Corporate governance and firm financial performance 
As discussed in the previous section, CG is a concept derived from “agency theory”. The fundamental 
purpose of a CG system is to deal with “agency problems”. The achievement of CG largely depends on 
the efficiency of the CG mechanism (or CG structure). 
Scholars often categorize the CG mechanism into two types, namely “internal and external CG 
mechanisms”. According to Gillan (2006), the “internal governance mechanism” includes the BODs, 
ownership structure, corporate rules and internal control system. The external mechanism is another 
kind of CG mechanism that may contribute to control the potential conflict of interests arising from 
the stockholders-managers’ relationship, which is performed through the environment in which firms 
operate (Gebba, 2015). The external CG mechanism consists of “the legal system, the judicial system, 
financial markets, and factor (labour) markets” (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013, p.3). 
This study focuses on the impact of two important “internal CG mechanisms”, including (i) board 
structure and (ii) ownership structure on Vietnamese non-financial firms’ performance.  
2.3.1 Board structure and firm financial performance 
The BODs is a crucial mechanism in the governance of modern firms (Guest, 2009; Gillan, 2006). Fama 
& Jensen (1983) suggest that the BODs is at “the apex of the system of internal controls” of firms. The 
primary functions of the board are to align the benefits of stockholders and those of managers, punish 
or fire underperforming managers who are unable to contribute to increasing firms’ values, or 
expropriating the firms’ resources. There are several features regarding the board structure. This study 
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selects four proxies of board structure, including board size, board gender diversity, board 
independence, and board duality to investigate their effects on non-financial listed firms’ financial 
performance in Vietnam. 
2.3.1.1 Board size and firm financial performance 
Board size is viewed as “an important attribute of board structure” (Nath, Islam, & Saha, 2015, p.107). 
It is defined as “the total number of directors” on the BODs (Guest, 2009, p.396). The main functions 
of the BODs are to supervise managerial performance, provide expertise (in forms of skills, experience, 
advice, etc.,) to CEOs, and give access to diversified resources (Hilman & Dalziel, 2003; Adams & 
Ferriera, 2007; and Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Through the CG literature, there exist various arguments relating to the nexus between board size and 
firm financial performance. Several scholars suggest that a larger board tend to benefit a firm for many 
reasons. First, a larger board may bring more “potential networking and skilled personnel” to the firm, 
thus improving the quality of strategic decisions (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). Secondly, larger board size 
may possess more collective information, which may result in to higher performance (Dalton & Dalton, 
2005; Lehn et al., 2004). Third, larger boards with additional outside directors may bring independence 
into the boardrooms, and hence provide better monitoring (Raheja, 2005).  
However, other arguments propose that the firm with a larger board may have some disadvantages. 
These disavantages can be “free rider” issues and coordination ineffectiveness. First, it is harder for a 
large board to organise board meetings and obtain agreement, which generate a slow-speed, less 
efficient decision-taking process (Jensen, 1993). Likewise, Lipton & Lorsch (1992) state that it is more 
difficult to obtain board cohesiveness in a large board due to different points of view, coupled with 
less readiness to share a common purpose by the board members. In a similar vein, Hermalin & 
Weisbach (2003) suggest that a small BODs can “coordinate and communicate better” and “make 
decisions faster”. Secondly, according to Lipton & Lorsch (1992), director “free riding” rises as the cost 
to a director who fails to exercise diligence is reduced as a result of greater board size. Moreover, 
Lipton & Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) posit that when the board size rises over a certain point, the 
disavantages prevail over the benefits of having a greater board size, resulting in a decrease in firm 
performance. For example, Lipton & Lorsch (1992) recommend that board size should not be over 
eight/nine directors. Similarly, Jensen (1993) reports that as the number of directors rises over 
seven/eight people, the board is likely to perform less efficiently and is “more easily controlled” by the 
CEO. However, Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) argue that there may not be an optimal board size for all 
firms. Diversified firms which operate in numerous sectors may need more advice, counsel and 
discussions; therefore a larger board might be more efficient for these firms. This argument is 
consistent with those of Klein (1998) who asserts that “the type and magnitude of advice” a CEO needs 
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are dependent on the size and complexity of the firm. In addition, it is also seen that board size varies 
across industries as Adams & Mehran (2003) show that manufacturing firms have significantly smaller 
boards than those in the banking sector. 
Studies that empirically focused on developed countries (i.e, the U.S and UK) broadly provide 
consistent evidence of an adverse effect of board size on firm financial performance, but those in 
developing countries, especially Asian countries, produce mixed results. For example, Yermack (1996), 
analysing the data of 452 large firms operating in the industrial sector in the U.S over the period from 
1984 to 1991, finds an inverse effect of board size on Tobin’s Q, and posits that more directors in 
boardrooms may lead to a decrease in the board effectiveness. Guest (2009) who examines 2,746 
listed firms in the UK during 1981-2002 period also reports that board size strongly and negatively 
influences the firms’ profits, stock returns and Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Gill & Mathur (2011) examine 166 
listed firms in Canada over the period 2008-2010 and posit that the firms’ performance is adversely 
associated with board size. Conyon & Peck (1998) use five European countries data for the period 
1992-1995 and show an inverse relation between board size and the performance of firms. Conversely, 
research in developing countries have produced inconsistent results. Haniffa & Hudaib (2006) on 
studying 347 listed firms in Malaysia for the period 1996-2000 find that board size positively impacts 
the firms’ performance. This is similar to Dwivedi & Jain (2005) who also find a positive impact of board 
size on the performance of Indian firms based on the data of 340 firms during 1997-2001. However, 
Mashayekhi & Bazaz (2008), using Iranian listed firms data, document that board size adversely 
impacts the firms’ financial performance. Rouf (2011) shows that small board size improves firms’ 
value in Bangladesh. 
It is also noted that the major issue when investigating the influence of board size on firm performance 
is the potential endogenity problem (Wintoki et al., 2012). There are “three sources of endogeneity”, 
that is (i) unobserved heterogeneity where both firm performance and board size are affected by 
“unobservable firm specific factors”, (ii) simultaneous endogeneity where board size and firm 
performance have simultaneous causality, and (iii) dynamic endogeneity where the current value of 
the board size is determined by the past value of performance. Using the OLS or FE estimators may 
lead to spurious results because the OLS estimator ignores the fixed effects of the firms, hence cannot 
control for unobserved (time-invariant) heterogeneity which leads to biased and inconsistent results 
(Wintoki et al., 2012, p.582). The FE estimator controls for unobserved heterogeneity, but in a dynamic 
framework, the estimates may be also biased when they do not allow current governance to be 
impacted by past performance (Wintoki et al., 2012; Flannery & Hankins, 2013). Wintoki et al., (2012) 
suggest that CG variables, including board size and other board structure, are dynamically related to 
firm performance. The SYS-GMM method is “the most appropriate” to analyze the CG - firm 
performance relationship in “a dynamic framework”. 
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Empirical studies with Vietnam’s data produce inconclusive results. Adhikary & Le (2014) study 58 large 
Vietnamese listed firms on the HSX from 2007-2009 and report that board size positively influences 
ROE and ROA, but insignificantly impacts Tobin’s Q. Dao & Hoang (2014) examine 30 Vietnamese listed 
firms selected for VNindex 30 in 2012 and document that board size is positively linked with ROE. 
Meanwhile, Vo & Phan (2013) analyse 77 Vietnamese listed firms on the HSX for the period 2006-2011 
and show an adverse impact of board size on ROA.  
The influence of board size on firm performance may differ from country to country on the ground 
that the roles and functions of the board may vary across countries because of the differences in the 
institutional and legal environments (Guest, 2009). In Vietnam, according to LOE 2005, the BODs of a 
firm must have at least three but no more than eleven members. Vietnam has considerable variances 
in management culture in comparison with the international practices. For example, Vietnamese 
management does not appear to share managerial power (Truong, Swierczek, & Dang, 1998). Thus, 
the cost of coordinating and sharing information among the BODs, board of management and 
supervisory board in Vietnam may be high. We propose the first hypothesis of the present study as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Board size has a significantly negative impact on the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. 
2.3.1.2 Board diversity and firm financial performance 
During recent decades, board diversity has been one of the most critical CG issues. Kang, Cheng, & 
Gray (2007, p.195) provide the definition of “board diversity as the variety in the composition of the 
board of directors”. Similarly and in more detail, Ingley & Walt (2003, p.8) describe board diversity as 
“the varied combination of attributes, characteristics and expertise” that board members possess. 
Board diversity is generally in the form of either “observable (or demographic) diversity” or 
“unobservable (or non-observable or cognitive) diversity”. “Observable diversity” consists of age, 
gender, nationality and race/ethnic background. Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader (2003) and Kang et al., 
(2007) suggest that “non-observable diversity” includes experience, technical skills, educational 
background, and organization membership.  
It is commonly thought that board diversity can increase financial performance. Board diversity will 
enhance board independence as members of the BODs belong to “different backgrounds, cultures, 
and nationalities”. Board independence will be increased through “asking various questions” which 
will “improve the board discussion”, “increase the creativity and innovation” and “provide new insights 
and perspectives” to the board (Rose, 2007; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003).  
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Nevertheless, studies to date provide mixed results about the correlation between board diversity and 
firm financial performance. Some research shows evidence that there is a positive association between 
them. For example, Carter et al., (2007), using all Fortune 500 listed firms in 1998-2002, postulate that 
board diversity positively impacts Tobin’s Q. Their result is similar to that of Erhardt et al., (2003) who 
study 112 firms in the Fortune 1000 for the period 1993-1998 and find a positive board diversity- firm 
performance linkage measured by ROA and ROI.  
Some other research shows a negative effect or no effect of board diversity on financial performance. 
For instance, Wang & Clift (2009) analyse the relation between ethnic and gender diversity and firm 
performance measured by ROE, ROA, and shareholder returns, employing 243 large Australia firms for 
the period 2003-2006, and indicate that diversity does not affect the firms’ performance. Similarly, 
Marinova, Plantenga, & Remery (2010) and Randoy, Oxelheim, & Thomsen (2006) study European 
firms and fail to find any significant correlation between the firms’ financial performance and board 
diversity. Zahra & Stanton (1988) study the influence of ethnic and gender diversity on ROE and EPS 
using 100 firms in Fortune 500 in the year 1980 and document that board diversity negatively 
influences the firms’ financial performance. Similarly, Dobbin & Jung (2011) show that the greater 
board gender diversity results in significant decreases in stock value. The argument that supports a 
negative effect of board diversity on firms’ financial performance is that board diversity may “slow 
down the decision-making process” (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996) or lead to greater disagreement 
and ineffective communication, which counter or prevail over the benefits of wider views (Dobbin & 
Jung, 2011). 
In recent years, board gender diversity, as one important feature of board diversity, has become the 
topic of many empirical studies (Rhode & Packel, 2014). The increasing focus on the board gender 
diversity theme in academia coincides with the recent movement in European countries to support 
greater participation of women in the boardroom as the result of the concern about the lack of gender 
equality. To date, as many as sixteen countries have set  quotas to promote female participation on 
the board (Rhode & Packel, 2014). The European Union has set a target of having 40 percent female 
non-executive directors in large firms by 2020, while Germany recently introduced legislation 
mandating 30 percent gender diversity of non-executive directors from 2016. Norway also introduced 
a quota of 40 percent gender diversity in 2003 for compliance by 2009 (Rhode & Packel, 2014). Spain 
followed Norway, enacting a law requiring all listed firms to increase the proportion of female 
members on the BODs to 40 percent by 2015. In Sweden, the participation of females on the board is 
also a legal requirement (Medland, 2004). Unlike Norway and some other European countries, where 




According to Low, Roberts, & Whitling (2015) and Carter, Simkins, & Simpson (2010), “agency theory” 
and “resource dependence theory” are considered as theoretical foundations that support the greater 
representation of females on the BODs.  
From the “agency theory” perspective, Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-Desgagne (2008) hypothesise 
that females often give a fresh viewpoint on complicated matters, thereby assisting the board to 
reconcile the differences in viewpoints and information in boardrooms with regard to solving problems 
and setting business strategies. Moreover, women tend to put forward questions on concerned issues 
(Bilimoria & Weeler, 2000) and take an active role on their board, resulting in increased civilised 
behaviour and improved CG (Virtanen, 2012; Singh & Vinicombe, 2004). Furthermore, boards with 
increased numbers of women monitor reporting systems more effectively and thus help to ensure the 
accuracy of the outcomes (Srindhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011) and improve the quality of information 
dissemination to the public (Gull, Irshad, & Zaman, 2011). Therefore, the participation of women on 
the BODs is expected to lead to a reduction of the principal-agent problem, and thus obtain better 
performance outcomes. 
“Resource dependence theory” views “the board as the provider of diversified resources” to firms, 
which Hilman & Dalziel (2003) termed as “board capital”. The women’s participation in the boardroom 
can promote creative and innovative solutions for a firm and thereby improve the problem solving 
efficiency because the greater diversity on boards can contribute various viewpoints which results in 
more solutions to the problems the board faces (Rose, 2007). Furthermore, the participation of 
females on the board may bring greater understanding of the marketplace. As the markets become 
more and more diversified, the diversity in demand from the firm’s potential buyers or customers can 
be better satisfied by diversifying the firm’s views which improve the firm’s capability to enter into 
these diverse markets and as a result lead to generating more value for the firm (Campbell et al., 2008; 
Carter et al., 2003).  
Despite the substantial theoretical support for increased gender diversity on boards, a relationship 
between financial performance and gender diversity is inconclusive. Adams & Ferreira (2009, p. 305) 
posit: “The literature on diversity also has ambiguous predictions for the effect of diversity on 
performance.” 
Carter et al., (2003) report a positive link between the participation of females on the BODs and Tobin's 
Q of 638 firms in Fortune 1000. Likewise, Erhardt et al., (2003) show a positive effect of the female 
directors’ percentage and the performance of 127 large U.S firms measured by ROA and ROI. Similarly, 
Campbell & Mínguez-Vera (2008) find a positive impact of board gender diversity on the performance 
of listed firms in Spain. In the Asian context, Julizaerma & Sori (2012) show that board gender diversity 
positively impacts the financial performance of Malaysian listed firms. Liu, Yu, Wei, Zuobao, Xie, & 
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Feixue (2014) analyse the impact of gender diversity on the financial performance of 2,000 Chinese 
listed firms during 1999-2011 and also show a positive link between board gender diversity and the 
firms’ performance measured by ROS and ROA. In a cross-country research of 3,876 listed firms in 47 
countries in 2010, Terjesen, Couto, & Francisco (2015) demonstrate that firms with more women 
directors exhibit greater financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. Similarly, in another 
cross-country research, Low et al., (2015) examine 5,503 Asian firms in South Korea, Singapore, 
Malaysia and Hong Kong, and show that board gender diversity positively influences the firms’ 
performance measured by ROE.  
Meanwhile, some other studies show no linkage between board gender diversity and firm financial 
performance. Gregory-Smith, Main, & O’Reilly (2014) investigate the relation between board gender 
diversity and firm performance measured by ROA, ROE, market-to-book value, and total shareholder 
returns, based on 350 large UK firms for the period 1996-2011 and conclude that gender diversity has 
no impact on the firms’ performance. Similarly, Rose (2007) documented that gender diversity does 
not influence the financial performance of Danish listed firms over the period 1998-2001. Rose‘s 
finding is similar to that of Farrell & Hersch (2005) who use the U.S data and find no impact of additional 
female directors on ROA. 
Several empirical studies show a negative effect of increased gender diversity on firms’ financial 
performance. Ahern & Dittmar (2012) study the impact of gender quotas on financial performance in 
Norway, where 40 percent of directors are required by law to be female. The authors examine 248 
firms from 2001 to 2009 and find that the quota is linked with a significant decrease in Tobin’s Q. 
Darmadi (2011), studying Indonesian listed firms, suggests that the presence of female members on 
the BODs negatively impacts Tobin's Q and ROA. Further, the author explained that the nomination of 
women to the BODs in Indonesia might be the result of family relationships instead of the expectations 
of their great contributions in terms of skills and knowledge; hence resulting in a decrease in the firms’ 
financial performance. The arguments on the drawbacks of the participation of female directors on 
the BODs is that greater board gender diversity tends to communicate less frequently in the 
boardroom (Cox & Blake, 1991; Earley & Mosakowski, 2000). In addition, gender diversity might 
generate some differences and inconsistences on the BODs and slow down decision-making processes 
since male directors and female directors have dissimilar leadership styles (Litz & Folker, 2002; Fenwick 
& Neal, 2001). Because of the problems in coordination and communication generated by board 
diversity, it may be difficult for the firm with a diverse board to have a fast decision-making process.   
A more complex result is provided by Adams & Ferrera (2009), who examine 1,939 U.S firms during  
the 1996-2003 period and posit that firms with more females on boards organise meetings more 
frequently, enjoy greater rates of attendance, have higher participation in decision-making processes, 
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have greater degrees of supervision, and are more likely to fire CEOs if neccessary. Greater 
representation of women in boardrooms negatively influences the financial performance of firms with 
sound governance and positively impacts the performance of weakly-governed firms. These findings 
reveal that while increased gender diversity on the BODs may lead to greater mornitoring of the board, 
it does not always lead to increased firm financial performance. Over-monitoring of the board may 
decrease shareholder values (Adams & Ferrera, 2009). 
In summary, although the greater gender diversity on boards is theoretically supported, the findings 
from empirical studies show ambiguous evidence regarding whether greater board gender diversity 
would lead to an improvement in firm financial performance. Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2008) explain 
that the inconclusive empirical findings are the consequences of the difference in sample timeline and 
country context, inappropriate estimation methodologies, such as the absence of relevant control 
variables such as leverage and firm size, or the failure to take into account potential endogeneity 
issues. 
Vietnam provides an interesting context in which the relationship between gender diversity and firm 
financial performance should be explored as to date, although board gender diversity is widely 
supported, there have not been any explicit regulatory initiatives or guidelines to promote women’s 
participation on the BODs. In such an environment, women would be appointed to the board based 
on their expected positive contributions rather than as a response to external pressure to make 
appointments of women. This environment enables us to analyse the significance of gender diversity 
in the absence of external influences. Until now, research on the linkage between board gender 
diversity and firm financial performance using Vietnam’s data have produced mixed results. For 
example, To (2011) who investigates the 100 largest listed firms in 2009 fails to find any significant 
impacts of board gender diversity on Tobin’s Q. Adhikary & Le (2014) examine 58 large firms listed on 
the HSX from 2007 to 2009 and report a negative effect of board gender diversity on Tobin’s Q, but no 
effect on ROA and ROE. Vo & Phan (2013) study 77 firms listed on the HSX from 2006 to 2011 and find 
a positive relation between gender diversity and ROA. Most recently, Nguyen et al., (2015) examine 
the link between board gender diversity and firm financial performance using a dynamic model 
framework to control for the endogeneity problem. Analysing 122 Vietnamese non-financial listed 
firms for the period 2008-2011, the authors also indicate that board gender diversity positively affects 
Tobin’s Q. Based on the empirical suggestions of Nguyen et al., (2015), the following relationship is 
hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 2: Board gender diversity has a significantly positive effect on the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. 
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2.3.1.3 Board independence and firm financial performance 
In recent decades, the importance of board independence with the presence of “non-executive” or 
“independent directors” on the BODs has been increasingly highlighted by regulators and shareholders 
activists. The Higgs Report (2003) in the UK suggests that the board should have more than 50 percent 
of directors as “independent, non-executive members”. The U.S has also introduced the same 
requirement (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2003). The efficiency of the board monitoring function over 
managers is considered to be linked with the board independence (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jahra & 
Pearce II, 1989).  
The appointment of “independent directors” is strongly supported by “resource dependence theory” 
and “agency theory”. From the “agency theory” perspectives, “outside directors” are appointed since 
they are believed to be “independent and free from conflicts of interest” (Ameer, Ramli, & Zakaria, 
2010). They could be experts from various fields and may provide independent views and judgement 
required for strategic decision-taking processes by the BODs, which create values for firms (Dalton, 
Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Fields & Keys, 2003). In addition, independent board members may 
be more motivated to safeguard stockholders’ benefits in order to maintain a good reputation (Fama, 
1980). According to “resource dependence theory”, “outside directors” can be seen as a valued 
“source of external resources and information” for firms (Hilman & Dalziel, 2003; and Fama & Jensen, 
1983) and essential for firms in “perceiving external risks” and devising ways to safeguard the firms 
against them (Ehikioya, 2009).  
However, proponents of “stewardship theory” argue that “executive directors” have more advantages 
than “non-executive directors” in terms of overseeing managers since “executive directors” possess 
greater firm-specific information on daily business operations (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) which 
enables them to make appropriate and informed decisions and address problems more efficiently. 
Furthermore, “non-executives” are often part-time members of the board and hence, the degree of 
their overseeing is minimized and their access to specific information required for making decision is 
limited (Bozec, 2005). Consequently, the appointment of “non-executive board members” may lead to 
an adverse impact on corporate performance. Weisbach (1988) also suggests that “non-executive 
directors” have less motivation to supervise management. 
Empirical studies of the developed world on the board independence - financial performance relation 
generate inconclusive results. Studying the U.S market, Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990) show that there 
exists a positive effect of the outside directors’ participation on firm performance. However, other 
research such as those of Klein (1998) and Yermack (1996) report that the appointment of “external 
directors” does not impact financial performance. Meanwhile, Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) show that 
the proportion of “outside directors” on boards adversely influences firms’ financial performance. 
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Outside the U.S, Krivogorsky (2006) investigates European firms’ data and documents that the 
proportion of “non-executives” is positively linked with financial performance. Similarly, O'Connell & 
Cramer (2010) find that the increasing number of board “non-executives” may lead to an improvement 
in the financial performance of firms in Ireland. Likewise, Dehaene, De Vuyst, & Ooghe (2001), 
analysing 122 large (listed and nonlisted) firms in Belgium, show that “outside directors” on boards 
positively influence ROE, but do not impact ROA. Moreover, the authors indicate that the significance 
of “external directors” appears to be greater for listed firms in comparison with nonlisted firms or 
holding firms or firms having only one blockholder (those who possess over five percent). Dehaene et 
al., (2001) also show a positive effect of the proportion of “external directors” on firm size and this 
effect varies considerably from industry to industry.  
Many studies in developing countries also show mixed results. For example, (Chang, 2004), studying 
Malaysian firms, demonstrates that financial performance exhibits an adverse link to board 
independence. Jackling & Johl (2009) also show an inverse effect of “external directors” on firm 
performance. In contrast, there are positive impacts of the independent directors’ participation on the 
firms’ financial performance in South Korea (Choi, Park, & Yoo, 2007) and Iran (Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 
2008). 
Empirical studies based on Vietnam’s data generally show an adverse effect of board independence 
on firm performance. Adhikary & Le (2014) study 58 large firms listed on the HSX in 2007-2009 and 
report an adverse correlation between board independence and ROE and ROA, but no significant link 
with Tobin’s Q. To (2011) analyses the 100 largest firms in the year 2009 and find an inverse effect of 
board independence on Tobin’s Q. Likewise, Dao & Hoang (2014), examining 30 listed firms in VNindex 
30 in the year 2012, suggest board independence adversely influences ROE. Meanwhile, Vo & Phan 
(2013) employing 77 listed firms on the HSX covering six years from 2006 to 2011 report an insignificant 
relation between board independence and ROA.  
In Vietnam, due to the limited source of independent director candidates, it is difficult for listed firms 
to select appropriate people as their “independent directors”. As a consequence, the efficiency of 
“independent directors” is questionable. In addition, according to Haniffa & Hudaib (2006), in a 
majority of emerging countries, the appointment of independent directors is made for political and 
business connections, rather than for expected expertise contributions. As a consequence, the firms’ 
performance may not rely much on the participation of “non-executive members” on boards. Thus, 
the following relationship is hypothesized:  
Hypothesis 3: Board independence has a significantly negative effect on the financial performance of 
non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. 
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2.3.1.4 Board duality and firm financial performance 
Board duality is considered as “the practice of a single individual serving as both CEO and board chair” 
(Krause, Semadeni, and Cannella, 2013, p.256). Board duality has attracted much attention for more 
than twenty years (Krause et al., 2013) following the outbreak of large U.S corporate scandals. One of 
the underlying causes of these scandals is that the powerful CEOs abuse their power to expropriate 
the interests of firms and shareholders. Since the 1990s, many regulators and governance activists 
have been pushing firms to split the roles of the board chair and CEO with a view to achieving 
independent leadership on the board to avoid any “conflicts of interest”. It started from 1992 when 
the Cadbury Report called for a separation of the positions of the chairperson and CEO. In the U.S, 
many proposals that call for a separation of the top two positions were introduced in 2009 by the U.S 
Congress and in 2010, under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Security Exchange Commission issued rules that 
oblige listed firms to disclose the reasons behind their board leadership structure (Dodd-Frrank Act, 
2010). 
Under the pressure of spliting the positions of the board chair and CEO, the shift to separate 
chairman/CEO roles has been seen across countries. According to a study conducted by Russell 
Reynolds Associates, in the U.S, 44 percent of S&P 500 firms in 2011 separated the roles of the board 
chair and CEO, a considerable increase from only 21 percent in 2001. Similarly, 62 percent of NASDAQ 
100 firms in 2011 split the positions of the chairman and CEO from only 45 percent in 2005. In Europe, 
the trend to separate the chairman and CEO positions is more established (Russell Reynolds Associates, 
2012). According to a European Corporate Governace Report in 2014, only 20 percent of European 
firms still combine the roles of the chairperson and CEO. A recent survey conducted by the UK’s 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) shows that 96 percent of FTSE 350 firms had a non-combined 
chairman and CEO in 2014. In Vietnam, the code of CG in 2012 promulgated by Vietnam Ministry of 
Finance stipulates that “a chairman/chairwoman of a board should not be in the position of the CEO 
of a company unless this duality is approved by the annual general meeting of the company’s 
shareholders”. 
The leadership structure of the board is a long-lasting debate with two contradictory theories. The 
“agency theory” strongly supports the view that the separation between the board chair and CEO 
results in an improvement in financial performance. Fama & Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) posit 
that duality may decrease the monitoring of the board over the managers of firms and the split is 
required to formulate the efficiency and effectiveness for the “check and balance” system by the BODs 
and CEO. Moreover, Jensen (1993) indicates that if one person holds the roles of the board chair and 
CEO, then the board cannot assess the performance of the CEO which may lead to a weak internal 
control system. This view is supported by Goyal & Park (2002) who argue that the combination of the 
chairperson and CEO hinders the board in removing underperforming managers. In a similar vein, 
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Finkelstein & D’Alene (1994) assert that the combination of the chairperson and CEO allows 
management entrenchment and reduces the independence of the board. By breaching this 
independence, board duality tends to negatively influence performance because it weakens the 
board’s potential to effectively supervise management (Jensen, 1993). On the contrary, the 
“stewardship theory” argues that if the positions of the board chair and CEO are combined, then the 
firm may have speedier decision-taking processes, lesser costs of information transfer, further 
improvement in the firm’s strategy implementation, and further effective leadership, thereby making 
contributions to achieving the firm’s objectives (Brickley et al., 1997; Chen, Lin, & Yi, 2008). 
Some authors argue that board leadership structure has no optimal form because either separation or 
duality has both benefits and costs (Brickley et al., 1997). Futhermore, Brickley et al., (1997) document 
that the costs are likely to be greater than benefits for larger firms. Goodwin & Seow (2000) further 
explain that the substantial cost could arise from the insufficient transfer of information and the mix-
up regarding who is responsible to lead the firm.  
Empirical evidence both in developed and developing countries shows mixed results related to the 
effect of board duality and financial performance. In the developed world, a majority of the studies 
focused on the U.S firms. Yermack (1996), analysing 452 large firms operating in the industrial sector 
in the U.S covering eight years from 1984 to 1991, reports that the split between the chairperson and 
CEO improves the firms’ performance. Donaldson & Davis (1994) and Rechner & Dalton (1991) also 
show a positive association between board duality and firm financial performance. On the contrary, 
Vafeas & Theodorou (1998) and Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand (1999) report no significant impact 
of board duality on firm financial performance. Within the developing countries contexts, Rouf (2011) 
examines 93 Bangladeshi non-financial listed firms in 2006 and reports that board duality positively 
affects ROE. Benjamin & Ehikioya (2009) and Chang (2004) show that board duality adversely 
influences the firms’ financial performance in Nigeria and Malaysia, respectively. Mashayekhi & Bazaz 
(2008), using data of Iranian listed firms for the year 2005-2006, show no impact of board duality on 
ROE and ROA. 
Empirical studies in Vietnam generally indicate a positive effect of duality on firm performance. Vo & 
Phan (2013) use the data of 77 firms listed on the HSX covering six years from 2006 to 2011 and show 
a positive linkage between board duality and ROA. Similarly, To (2011) examining the 100 largest listed 
firms in 2009 shows a positive relationship between board duality and Tobin’s Q. Meanwhile, Dao & 
Hoang (2014) investigate 30 listed firms in VNindex 30 for the year 2012 and find that board duality 




Hypothesis 4: Board duality has a significant positive affect on the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. 
2.3.2 Ownership structure and firm financial performance 
Berle & Means (1932) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) state that “the separation of ownership and 
control” may result in “agency problems” between shareholders and managers when managers who 
control the firm may seek to pursue their benefits instead of stockholder’ benefits. This concern has 
made the ownership structure issue become one of the most critical and attractive subjects in the CG 
literature.  
2.3.2.1 Insider ownership and firm financial performance 
As an important dimension of ownership structure, insider ownership is one of the most discussed 
issues because insider ownership has been viewed as a device to control managers’ self-interested 
behaviours (Park & Jang, 2010; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Farma & Jensen (1983) indicate that insider ownership may lead to two 
conflicting effects on firm governance: (i) interests’ convergence with stockholders, and (ii) the effect 
of entrenchment. According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), increasing insider ownership may “align the 
interests of managers with shareholders’ values”. They further explain that managers tend to restrict 
themselves to consume a firm’s resources as their holding grows because such consumption of the 
firm’s resources would fall to them in proportion to their ownership. In this way, the “hypothesis of 
convergence of interests” with shareholders prevails, which may result in a positive effect on the firm’s 
performance. Conversely, Demzets (1983) and Fama & Jensen (1983) put forward an argument that 
under the pressure of market discipline, the insiders may act toward the stockholders’ benefits in spite 
of their small shareholdings. However, when the insiders increase their holding of the firm’s shares to 
a certain level that allows them to gain a substantial voting power, they can pursue their goals instead 
of maximising shareholders’ values without endangering their position or salary. In this way, the 
“hypothesis of entrenchment” prevails, which may result in a negative effect on the firm’s financial 
performance. 
Empirical studies on the linkage between insider ownership and firm financial performance produce 
mixed results. Chung & Pruitt (1996) evaluate 404 U.S public firms in 1987 and show a positive 
relationship between executive equity ownership and the performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Similarly, Bhagat & Bolton (2008) show evidence of a convergence effect of board ownership on firms’ 
performance. Shah & Hussain (2012) report a negative link between managerial ownership and the 
firms’ performance when examining 61 non-financial listed firms in Pakistan in the period 2008-2010. 
Meanwhile, Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) examine 383 U.S firms in Forbes-standing in 1987 and fail to 
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find any effect of insider ownership on Tobin’s Q. Several other research shows a non-linear relation 
between insider ownership and firm financial performance. For example, Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) 
and McConnell & Servaes (1990) show an inverted U-shaped relation between insider ownership and 
the firms’ performance using the data of listed firms in the U.S, meaning the financial performance 
increases at a low level and decreases at a high level of insider ownership. De Miguel, Pindado, & De 
la Torre (2004) examine 135 non-financial listed firms in Spain during 1990-1999 and show a cubic 
relation between insider ownership and the firms’ financial performance, which means the firms’ 
performance increases at low and high levels of insider ownership and decreases at an intermediate 
level of insider ownership. 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985) suggest that the ownership structure is endogenous. The authors argue  that 
there is no systematic relation between ownership concentration and the profit rates; and there is no 
common ownership structure that suits all firms, thus each firm should choose the relevant ownership 
structure (whether concentrated or dispersed) that can maximise a firm’s value. Notably, they find a 
significant relation between ownership structure and firm specific characteristics (which can also 
influence firm performance). Similarly, Demsetz & Villalonga (2001), among others, indicate that 
ownership structure is endogenous, arguing that firm performance and ownership structure may have 
a simultaneous causality relationship which may present the endogeneity problem. Therefore, 
analysing the linkage between insider ownership and firm financial performance may require 
consideration of the endogeneity issue. 
Based on the findings of Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) and McConnell & Servaes (1990), we expect 
insider ownership and the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms to form an 
inverted U-shaped relationship. Thus, the following relationship is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 5: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between insider ownership and the financial 
performance of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. 
2.3.2.2 Ownership concentration and firm financial performance 
There are two fundamental structures of corporate ownership, namely: “concentrated ownership 
structure” and “dispersed ownership structure”. The wide dispersion of ownership is typically 
observed among a majority of developed countries. Meanwhile, the concentration of ownership is 
generally seen in many developing countries which are frequently characterised by the absence of 
sufficiently sound judicial and regulatory frameworks. La Porta et al., (1997) and La Porta et al., (1998) 
suggest that concentrated ownership is a consequence of varying levels of judicial protection tools for 
minority stockholders from country to country. This is because increasing concentration of ownership 
appears to help enhance the voice of shareholders in pressuring managers to maximise the benefits of 
shareholders and other stakeholders. The CG literature points out that concentrated ownership (or 
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block ownership) is an important internal governance mechanism, especially when blockholders are 
prevalent across firms and around the world. Holderness (2009) shows in his study that 96 percent of 
the U.S firms and 93 percent of non-U.S firms contain from one blockholder. 
The question of whether ownership concentration may help enhance the management and 
supervision over expropriation risks is a long-lasting debate. “Agency theory” posits that the 
concentration of ownership may help reduce the “agency problem” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This is 
because in firms with highly dispersed ownership structure, minority shareholders often lack 
information and refrain from investing their own resources in supervising managers. Meanwhile, 
“large shareholders” have stronger incentives to monitor firms. This is because their great stakes in 
the firms create more incentives for them to bear the cost of monitoring management (Holderness, 
2003). In addition, “large shareholders” are better able to collect information and have practical power 
to monitor management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Through employing their own voting power or 
coordinating voting power among some large shareholders if neccessary, they can influence managers 
to carry out efficient management and discipline entrenched managers. Large shareholders may also 
choose to exit a firm through selling their stocks and; driving the stock prices down, which puts 
pressure on the managers of the firm to pursue the objectives of maximising stockholders’ values 
(Edmans, 2011). The benefits generated by ownership concentration appears to be more pronouced 
in countries where shareholder protection from a judicial framework remains limited (La Porta et al.,  
1999). 
However, if large shareholders follow their own goals which depart from pursuing the shareholders’ 
wealth, then it can adversely impact the minority shareholders (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishney, 1988). They will utilise the power they have to take out a firm’s resources to 
maximize their own interests. Thus, corporate performance is affected as the wealth of the firm is 
extracted by large shareholders. 
Empirically, the CG literature documents inconclusive evidence about the link between ownership 
concentration and firm financial performance. For example, McConnell & Servaes (1990) examine 
1,173 U.S listed firms in 1976 and 1,093 U.S listed firms in 1986 and report a positive impact of 
ownership concentration on Tobin’s Q. However, Lehmann & Weigand (2000), using data of 361 firms 
in Germany from 1991-1996, show a negative linkage between ownership concentration and the firms’ 
profitability. Demsetz & Lehn (1985) examine 511 U.S firms in 1980 and show no significant impact of 
ownership concentration on the firms’ profit rates. Meanwhile, many other studies find a curvilinear 
relation between CG and firm performance, which means both convergence and expropriation effects 
of ownership concentration on firm financial performance are present. For instance, De Miguel et al., 
(2004) using the data of listed firms in Spain show an inverted U-shaped relation between ownership 
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concentration and the financial performance. Similarly, Thomsen & Pedersen (2000) report an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and financial performance as a result of 
investigating 435 firms from 12 European countries. 
According to OECD (2006), In the “outsider system” of CG that is practised by several countries such 
as the UK and U.S where the ownership structure is highly dispersed, the main “conflict of interest is 
between managers and shareholder”. Conversely, in the “insider system” that is exercised in  countries 
such as Germany, Japan and a number of emerging countries characterised by the “high degree of 
ownership concentration”, the major “conflict of interest is between the controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders” (OECD, 2006, p.71). Nevertheless, these dissimilarities may also be derived 
from variations in the judicial systems, institutional settings, along with cultural, historical elements 
(OECD, 2006). 
Based on suggestions of De Miguel et al., (2004) and Thomsen & Pedersen (2000), I expect a non-linear 
relationship between ownership concentration and the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms. Moreover, given the high degree of ownership concentration of listed firms in 
Vietnam (World Bank, 2013a), I believe that the firms’ financial performance may increase at a low 
level of ownership concentration and decreases at an intermediate level of ownership concentraton, 
but when ownership concentration reaches a significant level, the interests of blockholders and those 
of shareholders will be closely integrated, which strongly motivate blockholders to play an active role 
in monitoring opportunistic managers’ behaviours, and exploit their resources to maximise the firms’ 
values, thus leading to an increase in the financial performance. Therefore, the following relationship 
is hypothesized. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a cubic relationship between ownership concentration and the financial 
performance of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the existing CG literature on the relationship between CG and firm financial 
performance. The chapter begins with definitions of CG. Next, the chapter presents an overview of 
fundamental theories of CG from different perspectives such as “agency theory”, “resource 
dependence theory”, “stakeholder theory”, and “stewardship theory”. Theoretically, sound CG may 
help improve firms’ financial performance. However, empirical findings to date by many researchers 
on the linkage between CG and financial performance show inconclusive results. Based on the existing 
literature, this study developed six hypotheses on the relationship between CG and the financial 
performance of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. Chapter Three presents the data and empirical 




Data and methodology 
Chapter 3 presents the data and methodology used in this study to examine the effect of CG on the 
financial performance of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. Section 3.1 introduces the data 
collection. Section 3.2 presents the variables including the dependent variables, explanatory variables 
and control variables used in the study. The endogeneity and dynamic relationship between CG and 
firm financial performance is discussed in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the model and estimation 
techniques. Section 3.5 and section 3.6 discuss pre-estimation tests and specification tests, 
respectively. Section 3.7 summarizes the chapter. 
3.1 Data 
In order to examine the correlation between CG and the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms, this study employs data of non-financial listed firms both on the HSX and the HNX 
over six years, from 2010 to 2015. The year 2010 is selected as the base time frame in the present 
study for several reasons. First, listed firms, which failed to comply with CG regulations, were not 
reprimanded before 2010 in the Vietnam securities market. Good CG principles for Vietnamese listed 
firms were first introduced in Vietnam in the year 2007 by the CG Ordinance of Vietnam Ministry of 
Finance issued on 13th March 2007. However, failing to comply with the CG Ordinance by listed firms 
has only been punished since 2010 when Decree 85/2010/ND-CP of the Vietnam Government dated 
2nd August 2010 on “Sanctioning of administrative violations in the field of securities and the securities 
market” was promulgated. According to Decree 85/2010/ND-CP, failing to follow the CG Ordinance is 
legally recognized as an administrative violation in the securities market. Second, access to the 
financial data of listed firms in the two exchanges from Datastream and Bloomberg is unavailable 
before 2010. Thirdly, using data from 2010, three years after the 2008 global financial crisis, rather 
than an earlier base time may help lessen possible noises derived from the consequences of the 
financial crisis which may affect the investigation of the relationship between CG and non-financial 
listed firms’ financial performance. We select the year 2015 as the last year of the study because the 
year 2015 is the latest year for which the data is available when collecting the data. 
Financial and banking sectors are excluded from our sample for many reasons. First, according to Fama 
& French (1992, p.429), banks and financial firms must be excluded “because the high leverage that is 
normal for these firms probably does not have the same meaning as for non-financial firms, where high 
leverage more likely indicates distress”. The difference in the operational nature of financial firms and 
banks with other industries makes the leverage, one of the variables in this study, incomparable. 
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Second, the financial and banking sectors follow typical standards of accounting regulations which may 
lead to differences in calculating financial performance with other sectors (Rose, 2007). Thirdly, the 
financial and banking sectors are also subject to stricter rules and specific governance regimes 
(Yermack, 1996). In Vietnam, banks and financial firms are not only subject to the provisions of the 
Law on Enterprise 2005, but also the Law on Credit Institutions 2010. According to the Law on Credit 
Institutions, the CEO and board chairperson of the banks must be separated (Article 34 of the Law on 
credit institutions 2010). However, non-financial firms may select either CEO duality or non-dual 
leadership. Moreover, the Law on Credit Institutions sets particular ownership proportion restrictions 
in credit institutions. Specifically, individual and institutional investors are not permitted to hold more 
than 5 percent and 15 percent of shares of a credit institution, respectively (Article 55 of the Law on 
credit institution 2010). Meanwhile, non-financial firms are free from such restriction provisions. 
Lastly, it appears to be a common practice in the literature to exclude the financial and banking 
industries from the sample when examining the relationship between CG and financial performance. 
Adams & Mehran (2011, p 1) state that “most studies exclude financial firms from their samples”. This 
is explained by the different fundamental operational activities (Fama & French, 1992; Vo & Phan, 
2013), and more closely regulated corporate mechanisms (Yermark, 1996; Schulz et al., 2010), and the 
different accounting system (Rose, 2007) of banks and financial firms in comparison with other firms. 
Following Lachenmaier & Rottmann (2007) and Serrasqueiro & Nunes (2012), non-financial listed firms 
with less than 4-year consecutive data are excluded from the study sample because our estimation 
approach uses lagged values of financial performance and CG as instruments. 
Financial data for this study are obtained from Datastream. Blockholder ownership and insider 
ownership data are collected from Datastream and Bloomberg, respectively. Board structure data, 
which is not availabe in Datastream and Bloomberg, is collected manually from annual financial and 
CG reports of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms which are available on the websites of non-financial 
listed firms.  
Ultimately, our dataset constitutes an unbalanced panel data of 412 non-financial listed firms with 
2,322 observations for the period of six years from 2010 to 2015. Previous studies on the relationship 
between CG and non-financial firms’ financial performance in Vietnam used limited sample sizes due 
to data accessibility. For example, To’s (2011) study uses cross-sectional data of only 100 listed firms 
for the year 2009. Dao & Hoang’s (2014) study uses only 30 firms for the year 2011. Adhikary & Le's 
(2014) study employs small samples with only 58 listed firms during the period 2007-2009. Nguyen et 
al.’s (2015) study uses data of 122 listed firms over a four year period from 2008 to 2011 (488 
observations). In comparison with prior studies, our larger dataset (in terms of the number of 
observations and the number of sampled firms) may enhance the estimation of the relationship 
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between CG and the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. The sample of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms is classified into nine industry catergories based on Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) including: (i) “Oil & Gas”; (ii) “Basic Materials”; (iii) “Industrials”6; (iv) 
“Consumer Goods”; (v) “Health Care”; (vi) “Consumer Services”; (vii) “Telecommunications”; (viii) 
“Utilities”; and (ix) “Technology” (FTSE Russell, 2017, p.9). This study uses ICB because (i) it is a broadly 
used benchmark for firms’ classification, and (ii) it is available from Datastream.  
Table 3.1 shows the number of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms in our panel data. There are 412 
non-financial listed firms, of which 231 firms are listed on the HNX and 181 firms on the HSX.  
Table 3.1 Number of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms in the panel data 
Stock Exchange Number of listed firms Number of observations 
HNX 231 1297 
HSX 181 1025 
Total 412 2322 
Source: Thomson Datastream (accessed on March 2017) 
Table 3.2 shows the sector categories of the non-financial listed firms in the data. The table shows 
Industrials, Consumer Goods and Basic Materials are the largest industries, in which Industrials 
accounts for 57.3 percent of total sampled observations.  
Table 3.2 Industrial classification of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms in the panel data 
No. Industries Number of observations 
1 Oil & Gas 68 
2 Basic Materials 212 
                                                          
6 Industrials is one of total ten industries categorised by ICB. Industrials includes two supersectors, namely (i) 
Constructions & Materials and (ii) Industrial Goods & Services. Each supersector is further classified into sectors 
and subsectors. Thus, Industrials comprises seven sectors and twenty subsectors. Seven sectors in Industrials 
include “(i) Construction & Materials, (ii) Aerospace & Defense, (iii) General Industrials, (iv) Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment, (v) Industrial Engineering, (vi) Industrial Transportation, and (vii) Support Services. Twenty subsectors 
in Industrials include (i) Building Materials & Fixtures, (ii) Heavy Construction, (iii) Aerospace, (iv) Defense, (v) 
Containers & Packaging, (vi) Diversified Industrials, (vii) Electrical Components & Equipment, (viii) Electrical 
Equipment, (ix) Commercial Vehicles & Trucks, (x) Industrial Machinery, (xi) Delivery Services, (xii) Marine 
Transportation, (xiii) Railroads, (xiv) Transportation Services, (xv) Trucking, (xvi) Business Support Services, (xvii) 
Business Training & Employment Agencies, (xviii) Financial Administration, (xix)Industrial Suppliers, and (xx) 
Waste Disposal Services”.    
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3 Industrials 1330 
4 Consumer Goods 348 
5 Health Care 80 
6 Consumer Services 147 
7 Telecommunications 6 
8 Utilities 82 
9 Technology 49 
 Total 2322 
Source: Thomson Datastream (accessed on March 2017) 
Table 3.3 shows year frequency of observation in our panel data. The time period (T) is not similar for 
all non-financial listed firms. This is because non-financial listed firms may enter or leave the stock 
markets at different points of time or data is randomly missing. Thus, the data constitutes an 
unbalanced panel data comprising 412 Vietnamese non-financial listed firms with 2,322 firm-year 
observations for the period 2010-2015. It should be noted that compared to the balanced panel, the 
unbalanced panel may have some disadvantages in the estimation of empirical models. According to 
Flannery & Hankins (2013), the unbalanced panel combined with endogeneity would lead to difficulty 
in the estimation and inference of empirical models. However, one of the advantage of using a panel 
data is that it enables researchers to employ an unbalanced panel to utilise all available data. In 
addition, Flannery & Hankins (2013, p13) suggest that the GMM estomator is likely to be “the most 
robust methodology for unbalanced panels with endogeneity variables”. This study uses the GMM 
method to work with our unbalanced panel data. 
Table 3.3 Year frequency of observations in the panel data 
No. Year Number of observations 
1 2010 298 
2 2011 388 
3 2012 412 
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4 2013 412 
5 2014 408 
6 2015 404 
 Total 2322 
Source: Thomson Datastream (accessed on March 2017) 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
In the literature, firm financial performance is measured by “accounting-based measures”, or “market-
based measures”, or both measures. This study uses Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable to measure 
firms’ financial performance. Based on the governance literature, Tobin’s Q is the most commonly used 
“market-based” proxy for the measurement of firm financial performance (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, & Fadzi, 
2014; Nguyen et al., 2014). Tobin’s Q is widely selected as a measure of performance in many studies 
on CG (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour, & 
Gunasekarage, 2008). As a “forward-looking measurement”, Tobin’s Q can reflect the market 
assessment and the forecast of a firm’s values that may not be accounted for in any accounting 
measures. These values may be intangible assets or potential future values of the firms (Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001).  
Tobin’s Q is introduced and defined by Tobin (1969) as the ratio of market value of a firm, including 
“market value of its equity” and its liabilities”, divided by “the replacement cost of its total assets”: 
Tobin’s Q =  
Market value of equity + Market value of liabilities
Replacement cost of total assets
                     (3.1a) 
When Tobin’s Q is greater than unity (Tobin’s Q>1), this means the stock market is optimistic about 
the firm’s value and further investment in the firm’s assets could be a good decision because the profit 
earned exceeds the actual cost of the investment. In contrast, when Tobin’s Q is less than unity (Tobin’s 
Q<1), the value of the firm are undervalued by the stock market and the firm should consider selling 
off the assets rather than putting them into use. In practice, constructing Tobin’s Q following the 
equation (3.1a) is difficult due to the unavailability of data on “the replacement cost of assets” and 
“market value of liabilities”. To solve this problem, Chung & Pruitt (1994) introduced an approximately 
constructed Tobin’s Q, in which the “replacement cost of total assets” and the “market value of 
liabilities” are substituted by “the book value of assets” and “the book value of liabilities”, respectively. 
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Tobin’s Q =  
Market value of equity + Book value of liabilities
Book value of total assets
                  (3.1b) 
By showing the correlation of this modified Tobin’s Q and the original Tobin’s Q is above 0.99, Chung 
& Pruitt (1994) demonstrate that researchers can employ the modified Tobin’s Q equation without 
worrying about the possibility that it departs considerably from the more theoretical Tobin’s Q in 
equation (3.1a) as the data required for calculating equation (3.1a) is unavailable. The use of Tobin’s 
Q equation developed by Chung & Pruitt (1994) becomes a common practice of researchers and 
practitioners because this equation not only offers an approximately and realistically calculated Tobin’s 
Q with available data from financial reports but also considerably simplifies the computational efforts 
(Nguyen et al., 2015).  
Although the Tobin’s Q ratio may still be subject to a concern of measurement errors (Klock, Thies & 
Baum, 1991), any other measures in any other experiments have similar concern because 
measurement errors may come from data collection errors or from the likelihood that the measure 
used is not a perfect measure to reflect the real phenomenon of economic relationships (Nguyen et 
al., 2014; Wooldridge, 2013). In the Vietnam context, this study chose “market-based measure” such 
as Tobin’s Q instead of “accounting-based measures” for the following reasons. 
First, “accounting-based measures” are subject to “firm-specific reporting errors” and potential 
“managerial manipulation” (Ahmad & Jusoh, 2014; Nguyen et al., 2014). In fact, those matters are 
relatively popular in Vietnam since Vietnam is undergoing a financial statement reform following 
international financial standards. Besides, the transparency of information in Vietnam, like some other 
developing countries, is a matter of great concern (World Bank, 2013b; IFC, 2011). 
Second, “accounting-based measures” may inappropriately reflect the value of some assets such as 
the land-use-right value. In Vietnam, the land-use-right value reported in financial statements is 
restricted by the price frame set by the Government, meanwhile in many cases, the market price of 
that land- use-right might be much higher due to real estate market booms (Trinh & McClusky, 2012). 
In this regards, “accounting-based measures” may be subject to severe measurement errors. 
Tobin’s Q, as a “market-based measure”, has the advantage of reflecting the firm’s potential values or 
hidden values. In the literature, Tobin’s Q has been seen as the best “market-based measure” of 
financial firm performance and used extensively by academics and practitioners to examine the CG-
firm performance relation (Ahmad & Jusoh, 2014, Al-Matari et al., 2014). Thus, this study  selects 
Tobin’s Q as the “market-based measure” instead of “accounting-based measures”. 
Following Chung & Pruitt (1994), Tobin’s Q at time t of a firm is computed by the following equation: 
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Tobin’s 𝑄𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 value of equity𝑡+ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 liabilities𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
           (3.1 c) 
Following Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998, and Nguyen et al., 2014, this 
study employs the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q as a measure for non-financial firms’ financial 
performance (denoted as lnQ).  
3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables include (i) board size, (ii) board gender diversity, (iii) board independence 
and (iv) board duality which are categorised as board structure variables; (v) insider ownership which 
represents the identity of ownership; and (vi) blockholder ownership which represents the ownership 
concentration variable.  
3.2.2.1 Board structure variables 
Board size 
Board size as an important feature of board structure is defined as “the number of board members”. 
The size of boards may substantially influence the effectiveness and capabilities of the board decision-
making in a firm. “Agency theory” (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; and Dalton & Dalton, 2005) argues that a 
larger board could enhance the monitoring capability of boards of directors over managers to ensure 
that managers work toward maximising owners’ values. “Resource dependence theory” (Pfeffer & 
Slancik, 1978; Raheja, 2005) suggests that a larger board with outside directors brings to firms more 
external resources and linkages with outside environments and; contributes to board independence 
by putting forward more objective views. Therefore, a larger board results in improved financial 
performance. The support for a larger BODs of “agency theory” and “resource dependence theory” is 
challenged by the arguments of “stewardship theory” that a larger size of board with different 
viewpoints may “lead to ineffectiveness in the decision-making process” due to difficulties in board 
communication and obtaining board agreement and cohesiveness, resulting in decreased firm 
performance (Jensen, 1993; and Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Several researchers go further to 
propose the optimal size of the BODs. For example, Jensen (1993) suggest that the board size 
comprising seven/eight members is optimal for a firm’s performance. 
In the governance empirical research, the relationship between board size and firm financial 
performance is inconclusive. Haniffa & Hudaib (2006) and Dwivedi & Jain (2005) report a positive 
correlation between board size and firm performance. Yermark (1996), Guess (2009), and Gill & 
Mathur (2011) show that board size inversely influences financial performance. 
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In the present study, the board size - financial performance relationship of non-financial listed firms in 
Vietnam is investigated. Following Guess (2009) and Wintoki et al., (2012), we use the natural 
logarithm of board size (denoted as BS) to represent board size in this study sample. 
Board gender diversity 
 More female directors on the BODs may have an effect on board efficiency. “Agency theory” 
(Francoeur et al., 2008) and “dependence resource theory” (Rose, 2007) argue that females are likely 
to generate fresh views and innovation which may help the BODs to improve the problem-solving and 
business strategy-setting. In addition, women directors supervise reporting systems more efficiently 
(Srindhi et al., 2011). Therefore, greater female participation on boards leads to better firm financial 
performance. On the contrary, there are several arguments on the disadvantages of the participation 
of females on boards. For instance, gender diversity might generate some differences and 
inconsistencies in the boardroom and slow down decision-making processes (Litz & Folker, 2002; 
Fenwick & Neal, 2001). Moreover, the increasing women’s participation on the BODs might lead to an 
exceeded supervision of the BODs over managers, resulting in the decrease in shareholders’ values 
(Adams & Ferrera, 2009). 
Empirical studies provide inconclusive results of the relationship between board gender diversity and 
firm financial performance. For instance, Carter et al., (2003) report a positive linkage between board 
gender diversity and the performance of firms in Fortune 1000. Similarly, Julizaerma & Sori (2012) and 
Liu et al., (2014) find that more female directors lead to improved financial performance in Malaysian 
and Chinese firms. In contrast, Ahern & Dittmar (2012) and Darmadi (2011) document that increased 
gender diversity negatively impacts the firms’ financial performance in Norway and Indonesia, 
respectively. Gregory-Smith et al., (2014), Rose (2007), and Farrell & Hersch (2005) find that gender 
diversity does not impact firm financial performance. 
In this study, to analyse the relationship between board gender diversity and non-financial firms’ 
financial performance, I measure gender diversity by the percentage of female members on the BODs, 
calculated by dividing the number of female directors by the number of directors. Gender diversity is 
denoted as FD. 
Board independence 
Board independence is viewed as one of the important elements of board structure. Board 
independence is represented by “the proportion of independent directors” or “the proportion of non-
executive directors” on the BODs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hilman & Dalziel, 2003; Wintoki et al., 2012; 
Weisbach, 1988).  
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The efficiency of the BODs in monitoring managers is considered to be linked with the board 
independence (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jahra & Pearce II, 1989). In the governance literature, “agency 
theory” and “resource dependence theory” support the appointment of “independent directors”. 
“Agency theory” argues that “independent directors” may provide independent and objective views 
required for dealing with the conflict of interests and making strategic decisions, thus leading to 
improved firm performance (Dalton et al., 1999; Fields & Keys, 2003). “Resource dependence theory” 
views “outside directors” as a valued “source of external resources and information” for firms (Hilman 
& Dalziel, 2003; and Fama & Jensen, 1983). In contrast, “stewardship theory” argues that in 
comparison with executive directors, external directors have less firm-specific information required 
for decision-making (Bozec, 2005), or less motivation to supervise management (Weisbach, 1988). 
Therefore, the appointment of “independent directors” might have an adverse effect on financial 
performance. 
In previous empirical studies, there is no consensus of the influence of board independence on firm 
financial performance. For instance, the impact of board independence on firm financial performance 
is found to be positive (Rosenstein & Wyatt,1990; Krivogorsky, 2006; Choi, Park, & Yoo, 2007; 
Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008 ), or negative (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996); Adhikary & Le, 2014; Jackling & 
Johl, 2009), or insignificant (Klein, 1998; Yermack, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). 
Following Agrawal & Knoeber (1996), Yermack (1996), and Wintoki et al., (2012), the current study 
uses “the percentage of non-executives” on the BODs, calculated by dividing the number of non-
executive directors by the number of directors on the board, to measure board independence. The 
percentage of “non-executives” on the BODs is denoted as NED. 
Board duality 
Board duality (denoted as DUAL) is when “the titles of the CEO and board chair are held by one person” 
(Krause et al., 2013). In the governance literature, the leadership structure is a topic of debate by 
“agency theory” and “stewardship theory”. “Agency theory” supports the view that the split between 
the board chair and CEO leads to better firm performance because the separation of the two positions 
enhances the effectiveness of the “check and balance” system by the BODs and CEO (Jensen, 1993; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983). On the contrary, “stewardship theory” argues that if the positions of the 
chairperson and CEO are combined, then the firm might obtain faster decision-making processes, less 
cost of information transfer and; further improvement in the firm’s strategy implementation; thereby 
contributing to achieving the firm’s goals (Brickley et al., 1997; Chen et al., 2008). 
Empirical studies report mixed evidence of the CEO duality - firm financial performance relationship. 
For example, Yermack (1996), Donaldson & Davis (1994), and Rouf (2011) document a positive effect 
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of board duality on firms’ performance. In contrast, Benjamin & Ehikioya (2009) and Chang (2004) 
report that board duality has an inverse impact on performance. Meanwhile, Mashayekhi & Bazaz 
(2008) show no effect of board duality on firms’ performance. 
Following Ammari, Kadria, & Ellouze (2014), and Nguyen et al., (2015), this study uses the dummy 
variable of board duality. The value of this variable equals 0 when the titles of the CEO and chairman 
are merged and equals 1 when the titles are separated. 
3.2.2.2 Insider ownership  
In the governance literature, there are two conflicting hypotheses on the impact of insider ownership 
on firms’ financial performance, namely the “convergence of interest hypothesis” and the 
“entrenchment hypothesis” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; and Farma & Jensen, 1983). The “convergence 
of interest hypothesis” suggests that firm financial performance increases with the increase in insider 
ownership. This is because the greater share holding of managers may “align their interests with the 
interests of shareholders”, thus drive them to work towards maximising the shareholders’ value which 
leads to better firm financial performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In contrast, the “entrenchment 
hypothesis” (Demzets, 1983; and Fama & Jensen, 1983) argues that firm financial performance may 
decrease at a certain level of insider ownership because as the shareholding of managers increases to 
a point that enables them to possess a substantial voting power, they may prioritize themselves over 
the benefit of shareholders. For example, the managers may become entrenched in order to secure 
their position and salary instead of taking risks in promising investment opportunities (Hill & Snell, 
1988; and Ellstrand, Tihanyi, & Johnson, 2002). 
Previous studies show inconclusive results of the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
financial performance. Chung & Pruitt (1996) and Fauzi & Locke (2012) report a convergence effect of 
insider ownership on firm performance. Several studies find no effect (Demsetz & Vilalonga, 2001; and 
Loderer & Martin, 1997) or an entrenchment effect (Shah & Hussain, 2012) of insider ownership and 
firm financial performance. Other studies show a curvilinear association of insider share holding and 
financial performance, meaning both convergence and entrenchment effects of insider ownership on 
financial performance coexist. The curvilinear relationship between insider share holdings and 
financial performance may be either the inverted U-shaped relationship, that is, firm financial 
performance increases at a low level and decreases at a high level of insider ownership (McConnell & 
Seraes,1990; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991), or a cubic relationship where financial performance 
increases at low and high levels of insider ownership and decreases at an intermediate level of insider 
ownership (Mocrk et al., 1998; and De Miguel et al., 2004). 
To investigate the relationship between insider ownership and non-financial firms’ financial 
performance, this study employs the percentage of insider ownership denoted as INSDO. This variable 
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is measured by the number of shares owned by insiders divided by the total ordinary shares of the 
firm. Insider ownership does not include the state ownership held by the insiders as the representative 
of the state ownership. According to “Decisions No.151/2005/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister” issued on 
June 20th 2005, the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) was incorporated and the primary 
objective of SCIC is to represent the state ownership in enterprises. SCIC is responsible for managing 
State capital, and making investment decisions in “key sectors and essential industries” with a view to 
consolidating the leading role of the state sector, while following market rules. The ownership of the 
State in Vietnamese listed firms is under the name of SCIC. In the Bloomberg data system, the State 
owership is separated from the personal ownership of insiders in the listed firms.7 The insiders include 
members of BODs, managers and chief accountant of the listed firms. 
3.2.2.3 Ownership concentration 
In the governance literature, the influence of ownership concentration on firm financial performance 
may be positive (the convergence effect prevails) or negative (the expropriation effect prevails). The 
convergence effect means that firm financial performance increases as the blockholder ownership  
increases. This is because block shareholders, in comparison with minority shareholders, have stronger 
incentives to monitor firms (Holderness, 2003) and have more information and practical power to 
monitor management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) to ensure the managers pursue shareholders’ benefits. 
Conversely, the “expropriation effect” of blockholder ownership on firm financial performance means 
that financial performance may decrease at a certain level of ownership concentration. The 
“expropriation effect” occurs when blockholder ownership increases to a point that allows them to 
“follow their own goals and expropriate the minority shareholders’ benefits” (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
and Morck et al., 1988). 
Previous empirical studies show that there is no consensus of the effect of ownership concentration 
on firms’ financial performance. Kapopoulos & Lazaretou (2007) and Gedajlovic & Shapiro (2002) find 
a convergence effect of ownership concentration on firms’ financial performance. Demsetz & 
Villalonga (2001), Demsetz & Lehn (1985), McConnell & Servaes (1990), and Shar & Hussain (2012) fail 
to find any effect of ownership concentration on firms’ performance. Meanwhile, Fauzi & Locke (2012), 
and Jiang, Yue, & Zhao (2009) report an expropriate impact of ownership concentration on firms’ 
performance. Other studies find both “convergence and expropriation effect of ownership 
concentration” on firms’ performance. For example, De Miguel et al., (2004) and Thomsen & Pedersen 
                                                          
7 In the Bloomberg data system, there is an option that allows researchers to access the State ownership to 
ensure the holdings of the State is not counted in the personal insider ownership. Therefore, many listed firms 




(2000) show an inverted U-shaped relation between ownership concentration and financial 
performance, meaning financial performance increases at a low level and decreases at a high level of 
ownership concentration. 
Based on the literature, this study employs “the percentage of blockholders’ ownership”, denoted as 
BLHO, as the proxy for ownership concentration (Morck et al., 1988; Nguyen et al., 2015; Vo & Phan, 
2013). A blockholder is defined as “the shareholder who holds from 5 percent of ordinary shares of a 
firm”. The percentage of blockholders’ ownership is the proportion of “the number of ordinary shares” 
owned by blockholders and “the number of ordinary shares” of a firm. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Apart from board structure and ownership variables used in this study, there are other factors which 
may have potential effects on firm financial performance. The relation between the dependent and 
independent variables may be influenced if these factors are not controlled for. Therefore, in order to 
remove these potential effects from our models (when these factors have no impact on the dependent 
variables) as well as mitigate the possible omitted variable bias problem (when these factors may have 
impacts on the dependent variables), it is necessary to control for the factors that may have impacts 
on the dependent variable. This study employs a set of eight control variables, including (i) firm size, 
(ii) firm leverage, (iii) firm age, (iv) firm risk, (v) firm profitability, (vi) number of insiders owning shares 
(vii) industry dummies, and (viii) year dummies. 
Firm size 
Following the literature, we select firm size (denoted as Size) as one of the control variables. The 
possible link between firm size and firm performance has been found in previous studies (Hall & Weiss, 
1967; Klapper & Love, 2003; and Antonio, Guney, & Paudyal, 2008), so accordingly, firm size is likely to 
have a positive effect on firm financial performance. Hall & Weiss (1967) and Bayyurt (2007) explain 
that larger firms with higher market shares and more plentiful resources may have greater 
competitiveness than smaller firms. Bigger firms are able to exploit opportunities to generate profits 
in sectors where large investment capital is required. In addition, Antoniou et al., (2008) suggest that 
bigger firms with higher transparency and lower insolvency risk may enjoy greater accessibility to debt 
markets at lower costs and greater borrowings than smaller firms, thus helping them to obtain profit 
maximisation of a tax shield. 
Firm size may also have a positive association with board structure such as board size or board 
independence. For example, Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja (2007) suggest that the level of 
supervision and ratification of the board over managers’ decisions tend to be higher in bigger firms 
than in smaller firms. The more complicated the information requirement is in a larger firm, the bigger 
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the board size that is required. In the same vein, Cho & Kim (2003) show a positive link between firm 
size and board independence in Korea. This is because larger firms with a high reputation and sufficient 
resources tend to adopt better CG mechanisms than smaller firms. Because of the possible association 
between firm size and both firm performance and board structure, firm size needs to be controlled in 
the current study to avoid omitted variable bias in the models. 
Firm size can be measured in many ways, such as “total assets”, the “market value of equity” or “annual 
sales” etc. In this study, we follow Wintoki et al., (2012) and Han & Suk (1998) to calculate firm size by 
taking the natural logarithm of “the market value of equity” of non-financial listed firms. We select the 
market value of equity to control for “size effect” because similar to Tobin’s Q, the “market value of 
equity” is a “forward-looking measure” that involves firm growth opportunities and stock market 
conditions. Furthermore, the accounting standard system in Vietnam is still imperfect and has 
gradually developed. Given that “the market value of equity” is a “market-based measure”, using it as 
the proxy for firm size appears to be more relevant than financial statement-based measures in terms 
of avoiding possible inaccuracy in accounting statements or differences in accounting methods applied 
by listed firms. 
Firm leverage 
Leverage (denoted as Lev) may have an impact on firm financial performance. Jensen (1986) and Ang, 
Cole, & Lin (2000) suggest that debt may reduce the cash flow of firms, thereby limiting managers from 
abusing firms’ resources toward maximizing their own benefits. In addition, the presence of 
debtholders may enhance monitoring by providing external supervision. Nevertheless, firms with high 
debt may have more risks of insolvency and less financial independence. It is also noted that leverage 
might link with other firm characteristics such as firm size. For example, Rajan & Zingales (1995) and 
Harris & Raviv (1991) indicate that leverage is positively correlated with firm size. Therefore, the 
inclusion of leverage is necessary to avoid “omitted variable bias” in the models. Following the 
literature, leverage is caculated by taking “the book value of total debts” divided by “the book value 
of total assets” in the present study. 
Firm age 
It is documented in the literature that older firms tends to have relatively poorer performance and 
decreasing market share value (Loderer & Waelchli, 2010). The most likely causes of the poorer 
performance of aging firms are the inability or unwillingness of firms to design contracts that bind key 
employees and utilise their ideas, and the inability to recommence their initial path breaking 
innovations (Loderer & Waelchli, 2010). On the other hand, younger firms appear to be evaluated more 
highly because of their faster growth and greater intangible-asset intensiveness (Black, Jang, & Kim, 
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2006). Following Ammari, Ayed, & Ellouze (2016), and Nguyen et al., (2015), this study measures firm 
age by taking the natural logarithm of the number of years from the time a firm lists on the stock 
exchanges (denoted as lnAge).  
Firm risk 
Following Guest (2009) and Wintoki et al., (2012), this study uses “standard deviation of stock returns” 
in each year to control for firm risk. In the literature, firm risk is commonly controlled using Beta or 
“standard deviation of stock returns” (Patton & Verardo, 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012; Guest, 2009) to 
capture the volatility of the stock price. The larger the volatility of the stock returns, the more the risk 
of the stock. Following Wintoki et al., (2012), this study uses “standard deviation of daily stock returns” 
in each year from 2010 to 2015. The daily stock price of listed stocks is obtained from Datastream. 
“Standard deviation of daily stock returns” of each stock in each year is computed by taking “the square 
root of the daily moving variance of the stock returns”. The “standard deviation of daily stock returns” 
is denoted as StdDev. 
Firm Profitability 
Profitability (denoted as Proft) indicates the capacity of a firm to generate earnings. It is observed that 
the firm with high profitability exhibits high performance (Phung, 2015). The governance literature 
shows a positive relation between firm profitability and financial performance (Phung & Le, 2013; 
Gurbuz & Aybars, 2010). This study selects annual earnings per share (EPS) as the proxy for the 
profitability of non-financial listed firms. According to Mlonzi, Kruger & Nthoesane (2011) and Islam, 
Khan, Choudhury, & Adnan (2014), EPS is seen as one important element to determine stock price and 
most individual investors based their investment decisions on the EPS. In this study, EPS is calculated 
by dividing “annual net income after taxes” by the “number of outstanding shares” in the year (Islam 
et al., 2014). 
Number of insiders owning shares 
The number of Insiders owning shares (denoted as NoInsd) is also used in the models to examine the 
relation between insider ownership and non-financial firms’ financial performance. Insider ownership 
might be associated with the number of insiders owning shares of the firms due to its calculation. 
However, the number of insiders may have an effect on firms’ financial performance (Han & Suk, 1998). 






We include industry dummy variables (denoted as Ind) to control for the possible effects of industry- 
specific characteristics. It is documented in the literature that industry may have an influence on firm 
financial performance (e.g., Bowman & Helfat, 2001; Chaddad & Mondelli, 2013) because the industry 
growth rate, industry concentration and industry-boost policies may induce differences in financial 
performance of firms operating in different industries.  
Nine dummy variables for nine industries classified by ICB are included in this study, including: “(i) Oil 
& Gas; (ii) Basic Materials; (iii) Industrials; (iv) Consumer Goods; (v) Health Care; (vi) Consumer Services; 
(vii) Telecommunications; (viii) Utilities; and (ix) Technology sector” (FTSE Russell, 2017, p.9). As the 
dummy variables, one industry dummy variable among them would be the benchmark category to 
alleviate the dummy variable trap. 
Year dummies (Year) 
In order to capture time specific effects, following Akbar, Poletti-Hughes, El-Faitouri, & Shah (2016) 
and El-Faitouri (2014), we include six year dummy variables (denoted as Year) for the period 2010-
2015 into our models. Year dummy variables should be controlled because each year could carry 
specific macroeconomic information of the year, including GDP growth rate, inflation rate, interest 
rate, exchange rate and other economic and stock market conditions. These specific macroeconomic 
conditions of each year may have an effect on the financial performance of listed firms. 
The definitions and measurement of the variables are summarised in Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4 Definitions of variables 
Variables Acronyms Definitions 
Dependent variables   
Tobin’s Q lnQ The market capitalisation plus the book value of liabilities 
divided by the book value of total assets. The natural 
logarithm of Tobin’s Q is used  
Explanatory variables   
Board size BS The number of directors on the BODs. The natural logarithm 




Board gender diversity  FD The number of female directors on the BODs to the number 
of directors on the BODs 
Board independence NED The number of non-executives on the BODs to the number 
of directors on the BODs 
Board duality DUAL Dummy variable equals 0 when the title of the CEO and 
chairman is merged and equals 1 when the title is separated 
Insider ownership INSDO The percentage of insider ownership in a firm 
Ownership 
concentration 
BLHO The percentage of blockholders’ ownership in a firm 
Control Variables   
Firm size Size The natural logarithm of the market value of equity of a firm 
Firm leverage Lev The ratio of total debts to total assets of a firm 
Firm age lnAge The number of years from the time a  firm was listed. The 
natural logarithm of age is used 
Standard deviation of 
stock returns 
StdDev Standard deviation of daily stock returns of a firm 
Firm profitability Proft Annual net income divided by the number of outstanding 
shares in the year  
Number of insiders 
owning shares 
NoInsd The number of insiders owning shares of a firm 
 
Industry dummies Ind Nine dummy variables according to nine industries classified 
by ICB 





3.3 Endogeneity and dynamic relationships between corporate 
governance and firm financial performance 
The endogeneity problem is a matter of concern among academia when analysing the relationship 
between CG and firm performance (Wintoki et al., 2012, Nguyen et al., 2015, and Schultz et al., 2010). 
Endogeneity occurs when the explanatory variables (i.e., governance variables or ownership variables) 
are “correlated with the error term”, which results in bias and inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge, 
2002). 
According to Wintoki (2007), Schultz et al., (2010) and Wintoki et al., (2012), there are three sources 
of endogeneity when analysing the CG - firm financial performance relationship, namely “unobserved 
heterogeneity”, “simultaneous endogeneity”, and “dynamic endogeneity”. 
Unobserved heterogeneity (also known as omitted variable bias) occurs when both firm financial 
performance and governance variables are correlated with unobservable firm specific components 
(Wintoki et al., 2012; and Roberts & Whited, 2013). For example, managerial capability, employees 
skills, and organisation culture are considered as unobservable firm specific factors. These factors may 
have impacts on firm financial performance and governance. Weak managerial capability and poor 
employees skills may result in a decrease in firm financial performance and stronger governance 
system arrangements to monitor managers. 
Simultaneous endogeneity (or simultaneity) occurs when firm financial performance and governance 
variables simultaneously affect each other. For instance, insider ownership may have an impact on 
firm financial performance. In contrast, firm financial performance may also influence insider 
ownership (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Therefore, firm financial performance and governance (both 
ownership and board structure) may concurrently affect each other. 
Dynamic endogeneity is considered as one source of endogeneity because there is a likelihood that CG 
variables are not strictly exogenous when current governance may be influenced by past  performance 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). For example, low past financial performance may lead to poor assessment of 
CEO capabilities from the board, which results in the possibility that the “CEO will be forced to accept 
more independent directors” on the board (Hermalin & Weshbach, 1998, p.97). This is viewed as a 
“direct effect of past performance on current governance” (Wintoki et al., 2012, p.585). In addition, 
there may be also an “indirect effect of past performance on current governance”. Wintoki et al., 
(2012, p.585) further explains that this indirect effect of past performance on current governance may 
occur when past performance influences firm specific characteristics and firm specific characteristics 
in turn may have an impact on current governance, then past performance indirectly affects current 
governance through firm specific characteristics. For example, the high past financial performance of 
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a firm may result in an increase in firm size. However, according to Boone et al., (2007), bigger firm 
size may require more directors on the board to ratify or monitor managers’ behaviour. Thus, the high 
past financial performance may lead to a larger board size. 
Wintoki et al., (2012) concludes that the current governance may be dynamically related to past 
performance. Similarly, Harris & Raviv (2008) and Hermalin & Weisbach ( 2003) also suggest that the 
CG - firm financial performance relation is dynamic. Wintoki et al., (2012) and Schultz et al., (2010) 
argue that failing to control for the “dynamic endogeneity” would lead to “spurious results” and 
inconsistency of the estimates of the relationship between CG and firm financial performance. The 
traditional techniques such as the OLS and FE estimators are not the solution for the dynamic 
endogeneity since they are designed for static models. The dynamic governance - performance 
relationship requires a dynamic model, meaning that past financial performance should be included in 
the models to examine the impact of CG on firm performance. 
Wintoki et al., (2012) when re-examining the impact of board structure on the financial performance 
of 6,000 U.S firms during 1991-2003 used the SYS-GMM estimator in a dynamic model and state that 
board structure has no effect on the firms’ financial performance. However, Wintoki et al., (2012) uses 
the OLS and FE techniques similar to prior studies (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996) and his 
estimation result is similar to those of Eisenberg et al., (1998) and Yermack (1996), that board size 
negatively influences the financial performance. This is because the dynamic endogeneity is not 
addressed in the OLS and FE estimators. Wintoki et al., (2012) call for the use of the GMM estimator 
in governance studies which is designed to address effectively the dynamic endogeneity problem. 
Subsequently, many other researchers have employed the GMM estimator to investigate the CG - firm 
financial performance relationship in dynamic models, eg., Nguyen et al., (2014); Arora & Sharma 
(2016); and Ammari et al., (2014). 
This study takes into account the dynamic endogeneity problem in the relationship between 
governance and firm financial performance. Thus we follow the studies of Wintoki et al., (2012) and 
Guest (2009) to use the GMM technique to identify the impact of board structure and ownership 
structure on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. 
3.4 Empirical model and estimation technique 
3.4.1 Empirical Models 
The objectives of this study are to explore the link between the financial performance of Vietnamese 
non-financial listed firms and CG features, including board structure (board size, gender diversity, 
board independence, and board duallity), ownership identity (insider ownership), and ownership 
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concentration (blockholder ownership). The governance literature suggests that the CG - firm financial 
performance relationship is dynamic in nature (Harris & Raviv, 2008; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; 
Wintoki et al., 2012). As discussed in section 3.3, the exclusion of the possibility that “governance is 
dynamically related to past firm performance may cause the dynamic endogeneity problem” (Wintoki 
et al., 2012, p.582). Taking the endogeneity problem into consideration, this study employs five 
equations (equations (3.2) to (3.6)) with the “lagged dependent variables” on the right hand side of 
each equation. Based on Wintoki et al., (2012), the general equation (3.2) is used in this study to 
examine the CG - financial performance relationship of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms as 
follows: 




+ 𝛿𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡              (3.2)  
Where, 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the financial performance of firm i at year t; 
𝛼 is the constant; 
𝜃 , 𝛽𝑘, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are estimated coefficients; 
𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 represents the vectors of the explanatory variables, including board structure and ownership 
structure; 
𝑍𝑖𝑡  includes “observable firm characteristics control variables”, including firm size (Size), firm leverage 
(Lev), firm risk (StdDev), firm profitability (EPS). In this study, they are treated as “endogenous 
variables” in the models.   
𝐾𝑖,𝑡 includes firm age, year dummy variables and industry dummy variables. They are treated as strictly 
exogenous in the models. 
𝜂𝑖  is unobserved firm fixed-effects (e.g., managerial ability, employees’ capacity, capital intensity); 
𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term; 
Research Objective 1 to Objective 4: In order to investigate the influence of board structure on the 
financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, based on equation (3.2), this study uses 




= 𝛼 + 𝜃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽1 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽3 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛾2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛾4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+  𝛿1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +   𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 +   𝑖𝑡                            (3.3) 
There are four dependent variables in equation (3.3) including Board Size, Board Gender Diversity, 
Board Independence and Board Duality. The control variables include Firm size, Firm Leverage, Firm 
Risk, Firm Profitability, Firm Age, Industry Dummies and Year Dummies. 
Research Objective 5: to examine the effect of insider ownership on the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, based on hypothesis (5) that the relationship between insider 
ownership and the non-financial firms’ financial performance is an inverted U-shape, a quadratic 
regression model is employed to answer this objective. Because the relation between insider 
ownership and the non-financial firms’ performance is expected to be a quadratic relation, in quadratic 
regression equation (3.4), the percentage of shares held by insiders and the percentage of shares held 
by insiders squared are included to formulate equation (3.4). If the relationship between insider 
ownership and the non-financial firms’ performance is an inverted U-shape, it is expected that the 
coefficient of the linear term of insider ownership is significantly positive, and the coefficient of the 
quadratic term of insider ownership is significantly negative. Equation (3.4) is given as follows: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝜃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
2
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛾1 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾6 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+   𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡           (3.4) 
There are two dependent variables in equation (3.4) including Insider Ownership and Insider Ownership 
squared. The control variables involve Board Independence, Firm size, Firm Leverage, Firm Risk, Firm 
Profitability, Number of Insiders owning shares, Firm Age, Industry Dummies and Year Dummies.  
To control for the impact of board structure variables on the non-financial firms’ financial performance 
while examining the relationship between insider ownership and the non-financial firms’ performance, 
the board independence variable is included into equation (3.4) as a control variable to capture the 
impact of board structure on the non-financial firms’ performance. In addition, as discussed in 
subsection (3.2.3), the number of insiders owning shares is used as a control variable in equation (3.4) 
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because the number of insider owning shares might be correlated with insider ownership of the firms 
due to its calculation. However, the number of insider ownership owning shares may have an effect 
on the firms’ financial performance (Han & Suk, 1998). 
Research Objective 6: in order to investigate the influence of blockholder ownership which represents 
ownership concentration on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, based 
on hypothesis (6) that the relation between ownership concentration and the non-financial firms’ 
financial performance is a cubic relation, this study formulates equation (3.5). In equation (3.5), the 
linear, quadratic and cubic terms of blockholder ownership are included. If the relation between 
ownership concentration and the non-financial firms’ performance is a cubic relation, it is expected 
that the coefficient of the linear term of blockholder ownership is significantly positive; the coefficient 
of the quadratic term of blockholder ownership is significantly negative; and the coefficient of the 
cubic term of blockholder ownership is significantly positive. Equation (3.5) is described as follows: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  
= 𝛼 + 𝜃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽1 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽2 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
3
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛾1 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +   𝛾2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 +  𝑖𝑡                 (3.5) 
In equation (3.5), the board independence variable which represents board structure is included as a 
control variable to capture the effect of board structure on the non-financial firms’ performance. 
Since insider and blockholder ownership belong to ownership structure variables, it should be included 
in one unified model to investigate the effect of one factor while controlling the impact of the other 
factor on non-financial firms’ performance. For this purpose, equation (3.6) is formulated combining 
equations (3.4) and (3.5) as follows: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝜃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
2
𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
2
𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
3
𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾1 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  
+ 𝛾6 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 +  𝑖𝑡      (3.6) 
Section 3.4.2 presents the estimation techniques of this study. 
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3.4.2 Estimation technique 
The estimation technique used in this study is the SYS-GMM estimator. However, to observe how the 
results change as different techniques are employed, this study also uses the OLS and FE methods to 
estimate the CG - financial performance relationship. 
The OLS estimator was considered to be the most common estimation technique until the endogeneity 
in governance study became a major concern. The OLS estimation method of unknown parameters in 
the linear regression is “to minimise the sum of the square of the differences between the observed 
value in the sample and predicted values of the dependent variable”. There are four assumptions for 
the OLS estimator to be valid: the linear regression model is linear in parameters; there is a random 
sampling of observations; there is no multicollinearity; and the condition mean is equal to zero 
(Wooldridge, 2012).  
As disussed in section 3.3, the fixed effects of the firm (𝜂𝑖) which are contained in the error term may 
determine governance and firm specific characteristics variables. For example, weak managerial 
capability and employees’ skills may result in decreased firm financial performance and stronger 
governance systems to monitor managers. Therefore the assumption 4 (zero condition mean) is not 
satisfied, leading to bias and inconsistent OLS estimation. 
The FE method is designed to eliminate the endogeneity caused by unobserved firm specific fixed 
effects. In order to do this, the goal of the FE estimator is to eliminate the fixed effects (𝜂𝑖) from the 
error term. Assume the following model 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝐿. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 +  𝑖𝑡          (3.7) 
Where, 
Y  is the firm’s financial performance variable; 
L.Y  is the first order lag of the firm’s financial performance 
𝛸 is the governance variables which are treated as an endogenous variable; 
Z represents “observable firm characteristics”, including firm size (Size), firm leverage (Lev), firm risk 
(StdDev), firm profitability (EPS). They are treated as endogenous variables; 
K includes firm age, year dummy variables and industry dummy variables. They are treated as strictly 
exogenous variables; 
𝜂𝑖  is unobserved firm fixed-effects (e.g., managerial ability, employees’ capacity, capital intensity); 
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𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term; 
































𝜂?̅? =  𝜂𝑖 since 𝜂𝑖  unchanges over time. 
Next, in order to eliminate the fixed effects 𝜂𝑖  which is contained in the error term, the FE technique 
constructs a time-demeaning equation as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = 𝜃(𝐿. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿. 𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?) + 𝛽(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝛾(𝑍𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + δ(𝐾𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝜂𝑖 − 𝜂?̅?) + ( 𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?)  (3.8) 
𝜂𝑖  is time-invariant unobservable firm specific fixed effects which does not change over time. Therefore 
𝜂𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖 and hence (𝜂𝑖 − 𝜂?̅?) is equal to zero in time-demeaming equation (3.8). 
Equation (3.8) can be rewriten as follows: 
?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝐿. 𝑌̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽?̈?𝑖𝑡+𝛾?̈?𝑖𝑡 + δ?̈?𝑖𝑡 + ?̈?𝑡          (3.9) 
?̈?𝑖𝑡= 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖; 𝐿. 𝑌̈ 𝑖𝑡=𝐿. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿. 𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?; ?̈?𝑖𝑡= 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖; ?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖; ?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖; and ?̈?𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − ?̅? 
The error term ?̈?𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡  in equation (3.9) no longer contains 𝜂𝑖  which correlates with the firm’s 
financial performance, governance and firm specific characteristics. The endogeneity caused by 
unobserved firm specific fixed effects has been eliminated. Thus equation (3.9) can be estimated using 
the OLS estimator without the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, one important condition for the FE estimator to be “unbiased and consistent” is that the 
current value of the model’s independent variables are “completely independent of past value of 
dependent variable” (Wintoki, 2012, p.562). In the context of CG, the FE method does not allow for 
the current CG to be affected by past performance. In equation (3.9) where past performance is 
included because of the “dynamic relation” between CG and the firm’s financial performance, dynamic 
endogeneity arises. This is because the error term ?̈?𝑡 contains 𝑖𝑡−1 which is correlated with 𝐿. 𝑌̈ 𝑖𝑡−1 
in 𝐿. 𝑌̈ 𝑖𝑡 (Bond, 2002). Therefore, the FE method still produces biased results. 
Wintoki et al., (2012) concludes that, since the FE technique is not designed to address the dynamic 
endogeneity, in a dynamic framework where past performance is included in the empirical models, the 
relation between CG and firm performance documented in prior studies that employed the OLS or 
fixed effects estimators is spurious as the endogeneity problems have not been fully addressed.  
In order to address endogeneity problems, researchers may also consider using the instrument 
variable approach (IV) or Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimators. These two approaches have a 
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common technique, that is the use of “external” instrument variables for endogenous variables. 
Nevertheless, employing these methods faces some challenges. First, it is “extremely difficult” to find 
“external instrument variables” in the CG context (Wintoki et al., 2012; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 
1999). Second, even if researchers may find external instrument variables, the correlation of these 
instrument variables and endogenous regressors need to be strong. Otherwise, using these methods 
may still cause estimation bias and extensive standard errors in the result (Himmelberg et al., 1999). 
Lastly, Hermalin & Weisbach (2003), Harris & Raviv (2008), and Wintoki et al., (2012) presume that 
financial performance is naturally dynamically linked with CG, and the consequence of ignoring this 
possible dynamic characteristic of the CG - performance relationship may lead to “the endogeneity 
problem” (Wintoki et al., 2012). The purpose of IV or 2SLS is not to deal with such “dynamic 
endogeneity” (Nguyen et al., 2015). IV and 2SLS techniques address two other sources of endogeneity 
which are endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias and simultaneity bias (Nguyen et al., 2015). For 
these reasons, the IV or 2SLS approach appears to be inappropriate to investigate the firm financial 
performance - CG relationship. 
Wintoki et al., (2012) suggest that the GMM technique is the most appropriate method to investigate 
the CG – firm performance relation. The GMM estimator can address the limitations of the OLS and FE 
methods as discussed above, and it employs “internal” instruments in the panel instead of external 
instruments such as the IV or 2SLS estimators. Wintoki et al., (2012, p.586) further explain that “past 
values of governance and performance can be used as instruments for current realizations of 
governance. This eliminates the need for external instruments”. Following the suggestions of  Wintoki 
et al., (2012), we employ the GMM estimator in this study. 
According to a number of researchers, the GMM technique is appropriate with panels where N > T, or 
“small T, large N” panels (Roodman, 2009a; Baum, 2006; Bond, 2002; and Baltagi, 2008). In this study, 
we analyze the relationship between CG and the financial performance of 412 Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms (N) over 6 years (T). Our panel has N > T, therefore it is relevant when we employ 
the GMM technique. 
GMM models may be either the difference-GMM or SYS-GMM. The Difference-GMM method was 
developed by Arrelano & Bond (1991), while the SYS-GMM was developed by Arrelano & Bover (1995) 
and Blundell & Bond (1998). We employ the SYS-GMM estimator in this study instead of the difference-
GMM estimator for the following reasons. First, when the model variables are close to “random-walk”, 
the difference-GMM method works ineffectively due to past level as the instrument for the difference 
equation conveys insufficient information on future changes (Roodman, 2009a; Baum, 2006; and 
Bond, 2002). It has been widely known that variables in the financial field are possibly random-walk, 
therefore the SYS-GMM estimator appears to be a better choice. Second, according to Roodman 
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(2009a) and Baltagi (2008), the SYS-GMM estimator, in general, is more efficient than the difference-
GMM estimator in terms of estimation efficiency because it improves precision and decreases finite 
sample bias. Unlike the difference-GMM, the SYS-GMM method involves time-invariant regressors 
(Roodman, 2009a). Lastly, the SYS-GMM estimator works more efficiently than the difference-GMM 
estimator with unbalanced panels (Roodman, 2009a). The panel data in this study is unbalanced, 
therefore we select the SYS-GMM approach. 
According to Wintoki et al., (2012, p.588), the SYS-GMM estimator involves “two simultaneous 
equations, one in levels and the other in first differences, which are combined into a system of 




]= 𝛼 + 𝜃 [
𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
] + 𝛽 [
𝑋𝑖𝑡
∆𝑋𝑖𝑡
] + 𝛾 [
𝑍𝑖𝑡
∆𝑍𝑖𝑡
] +  𝑖𝑡    (3.10) 
Where,  
Y is the performance variable. 
𝛸 is the governance variables which are treated as endogenous; 
Z is observable firm characteristics. They are treated as endogenous; 
𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term; 
In the level equation, “lagged first differences” of independent variables are used as instruments. 
Conversely, for the equation in the first-differenced form, “lagged levels” of independent variables are 
used as instruments (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Antoniou, 2008; Wintoki et al., 2012). The SYS-GMM 
estimator enables researchers “to treat any of the variables in the system as endogenous” (Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). 
In addition, we select two-step SYS-GMM instead of one-step SYS-GMM in this study because the two-
step SYS-GMM estimator can produce robust outcomes in the presence of heteroscedasticity of the 
data (Roodman, 2009a). According to Baltagi (2008), the limitation of two-step in comparison with 
one-step is that it makes standard errors downwardly biased. Following previous empirical studies, we 
use “Windmeijer correction” to eliminate the limitation of the two-step SYS-GMM estimator to 
improve the accuracy in the estimation (Windmeijer, 2005; and Baltagi, 2008).  
Based on Wintoki et al., (2012), this study treats lags of performance, board size, board gender 
diversity, board duality, board independence, insider ownership, ownership concentration, firm size, 
firm leverage, firm risk, the number of insiders owning shares, and firm profitability as endogenous 
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variables. Meanwhile, firm age, industry dummies and year dummies are treated as “strictly 
exogenous” variables. 
I follow Wintoki et al., (2012) to employ the first lags of performance in our models and the third and 
fourth lags of level variables as instruments in the differenced equation.   
Section (3.5) presents the pre-estimation tests including the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test to test 
for the endogeneity of the endogenous regressors, the modified Wald test for “heteroscedasticity” 
and the Wooldridge test for “autocorrelation”. Section (3.6) discusses specification tests involving the 
Hansen-J test for “over-identifying restrictions” and the Arrelano and Bond test for “autocorrelation”. 
These pre-estimation and specification tests are performed to ensure the GMM method is apropriate 
for this study. 
3.5 Pre-estimation tests 
3.5.1 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the endogeneity of the endogenous 
regressors 
The governance literature has shown that board structure, ownership and firm characteristics 
variables are potentially endogenous (Wintoki et al., 2012; Himmelberg et al., 1999; and Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1998). Especially if the endogenity issue comes from the effects of past values of firms’ 
financial performance, then the OLS or FE estimators cannot be selected as an estimation approach 
because they produce spurious results (Wintoki et al., 2012, Flannery & Hankins, 2013). However, 
before using the GMM technique, it is required to test whether the suspected endogenous variables 
are actually endogenous (Scholtz et al., 2010; Nguyen et al, 2015).  
The DWH test is based on the levels of firms’ financial performance and the CG and control variables 
(Schultz et al., 2010). The instruments include one-year “lagged differences” of suspected endogenous 
explanatory and control variables. Based on Schultz et al., (2010), and Nguyen et al., (2015), except for 
three control variables such as firm age, year dummy and industry dummy variables which are included 
into the DWH test and treated as “strictly exogenous”, the present study treats all explanatory 
variables and the remaining control variables as endogenous.  
The test statistic follows a Chi-square distribution. The “degrees of freedom” are equal to the number 
of “endogenous variables”. The null hypothesis under the DWH test is that suspected “endogenous 
variables” can be treated as “exogenous variables”. If the “null hypothesis” cannot be rejected, it is 
irrelevant to use the GMM technique. The test result justifies the use of the GMM method. 
In this study, this test is carried out for equations (3.3) to (3.6). 
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3.5.2 The modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity and the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation 
In case of the presence of “heteroscedasticity” and “autocorrelation”, the GMM approach works more 
efficiently than the FE estimator (Wooldridge, 2001). Although these tests are not decisive for the 
choice of the GMM estimator such as the DWH test, the results of these tests are supportive for the 
GMM approach selectors. In this study, for equations (3.3) to (3.6), we employ the modified Wald test 
to test for “heteroscedasticity” and the Wooldridge test for “autocorrelation”. The “null hypothesis” 
of the modified Wald test is that no “heteroscedasticity” is present in the study sample. The 
Wooldridge test for “serial correlation” is under the “null hypothesis” of non-autocorrelation of the 
data. Thus, if the p-values of these tests results are lower than 0.05, then the “null hypothesis” of these 
tests is rejected, meaning that “heteroscedasticity” and “serial correlation” are present in the data; 
hence the use of the GMM estimator instead of the FE estimator is the better option. 
In addition to the DWH test for the endogeneity, the modified Wald test for “heteroscedasticity” and 
the Wooldridge test for “autocorrelation”, this study also considers the panel stationarity test. This is 
because in the field of economics and finance, time related or seasonal shocks in one time period may 
influence subsequent periods. In other words, the economic or finance variables may include 
deterministic components or close to random walk. Meanwhile, one basic assumption of the classical 
linear regression model is that current values of variables should be independent of their past values. 
The aim of testing for stationarity is to check whether the mean and variance of variables depend on 
time. If it is the case, then the panel is nonstationary which may lead to spurious regression results.  
There are several stationarity tests such as “Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Harris and Tzavalis (1999); 
Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997 and 2003), Maddala and Wu (1999), Hadri (2000), and 
Hadri and Larsson (2005)” (Hlouskova & Wagner, 2005, p.3). The null hypothesis of these tests states 
that “all panels contain a unit root”. If the null hyothesis is not rejected, then the panel is 
nonstationary.  
While recognising the importance of “unit root tests” for panel data, the present study does not carry 
out unit root tests for several reasons. First, it is observed that the issue of stationarity is unlikely to 
arise if the number of time periods (T) is short i.e, T < 10. Many unit root tests have asymtotics of T → 
∞ such as Breitung (2000), Choi (2001) (or Fisher-type test), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), and Hadri 
(2000) test. When T is short, the power of the unit root test may be reduced significantly (Hoang & 
Mcnown, 2006). The panel data of this study is short with T = 6, so the concern of the nonstationarity 
problem may be lessened and the the power of the unit root test may be reduced. Second, except for 
the Im, Pesaran and Shin test and the Fisher-type test that allow researchers to test for unit roots of 
unbalanced panels, most of the “unit root tests” are applied to only balanced panels i.e, Harris and 
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Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000), and Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test. Since the panel data of this study 
is unbalanced panel, the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test and the Fisher-type test are the possible 
options to test for unit roots. However, the software (in STATA) to run the Im, Pesaran and Shin test 
does not allow us to test for unit roots of unbalanced panel data with T < 10. Meanwhile, the Fisher-
type test is under the asymtotics of T → ∞ and N → finite or infinite. Our panel has T = 6 year, so it 
seems to be inappropriate to rely on asymtotics of T → ∞ in the Fisher-type test. These may be the 
reasons it is difficult to find the “unit root test” result reported in CG - firm performance papers. 
3.6 Specification tests 
Specification tests are crucial to check for the validity in using the GMM estimator. For equations (3.3) 
to (3.6), this study employs two common specification tests, including the Hansen-J test for “over-
identifying restrictions” and the Arrelano and Bond test for “autocorrelation”. 
3.6.1 The Hansen-J test for over-identifying restrictions  
One characteristic of the GMM estimator is the use of many instruments. If the instruments are invalid, 
then the GMM estimator is inconsistent. The Hansen-J test for “over-identifying restrictions” is “the 
most standard test” to check whether the model is specified and the instruments used are valid (Baum, 
2006).  
The Hansen-J test is under “the null hypothesis” that the instruments are “valid instruments” i.e, 
“uncorrelated with the error term”. If the “null hypothesis” is rejected, then the specification of the 
model and the instruments are invalid. Conversely, the instruments are valid. The Hansen-J test follows 
a Chi-square distribution. The “degrees of freedom” are equal to “the difference between the number 
of moment conditions and the number of parameters” (Baum, 2006).  
It should be noted that an alternative test for over-identifying restrictions is Sargan over-identifying 
restrictions. However, Roodman (2009b) suggests that the Sargan test is less robust than the Hansen-
J test if there is autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the sample data. The efficiency of the 
Hansen-J test, nevertheless, would be reduced when there is instrument proliferation (too many 
instruments). In other words, enormous instruments may cause the Hansen-J test to be less powerful 
in testing the instruments’ invalidity (Roodman, 2009b). Following Wintoki et al., (2012), this study 
keeps the number of instruments reduced by using the command “collapse” in STATA. Thus, the use 
of the Hansen-J test for over-indentifying restrictions is relevant. 
Furthermore, the Hansen-J test also allows us to check whether any subset of instruments such as 
levels, differenced or IV are valid. The “null hypothesis” is that the instrument subset is exogenous i.e, 
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“uncorrelated with the error term”. The rejection of the “null hypothesis” means that “the subset of 
instruments” is endogenous. 
For equations (3.3) to (3.6), the Hansen-J test is carried out. 
3.6.2 The Arrelano and Bond test for autocorrelation 
Another important condition to ensure the “validity of instruments” used in the GMM estimator is that 
there is no “autocorrelation” in the idiosyncratic disturbance 𝑖𝑡 (Roodman, 2009a).  
The Arrelano and Bond test is designed to test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic disturbance 𝑖𝑡. 
According to the Arrelano and Bond test, in order to detect the serial correlation in the idiosyncratic 
disturbance 𝑖𝑡, the Arrelano and Bond test checks for “autocorrelation” via the residual in differences 
𝛥 𝑖𝑡  (𝛥 𝑖𝑡= 𝑖𝑡 - 𝑖𝑡−1). 
Arrelano & Bond (1991) suggest that “the first-order serial correlation in differences AR(1) is likely to 
be present”. This is because ∆ 𝑖𝑡  would mathematically correlate with 𝛥 𝑖𝑡−1 when both ∆ 𝑖𝑡  and 
𝛥 𝑖𝑡−1 have the shared term 𝑖𝑡−1. Nevertheless, the evidence of autocorrelation in the AR(1) is 
uninformative (Roodman, 2009a). 
𝛥 𝑖𝑡  is likely to correlate with 𝛥 𝑖𝑡−1, but may  be uncorrelated with 𝛥 𝑖𝑡−𝑘 for k ≥ 2 (Roodman, 2009a). 
Thus, instead of looking at the first-order autocorrelation in differences AR(1), researchers pay 
attention to the “second-order autocorrelation in differences” AR(2), in the sense that this would check 
for the serial correlation between 𝑖𝑡  in  ∆ 𝑖𝑡  ( 𝛥 𝑖𝑡= 𝑖𝑡 - 𝑖𝑡−1) and 𝑖𝑡−2 in ∆ 𝑖𝑡−2  (𝛥 𝑖𝑡−2= 𝑖𝑡−1 - 
𝑖𝑡−2) (Roodman, 2009a, p.119). More specifically, to detect serial correlation in levels of order n, the 
Arrelano and Bond test would check for serial correlation in differences of order n+1.  
If there is no autocorrelation of order n,  the lags of order n or higher are valid instruments in the GMM 
model. For example, if autocorrelation in the AR(1) is present, but the AR(2) is free of 
“autocorrelation”, then lags of order two, three or higher are valid instruments.  
The “null hypothesis” is that there is no “autocorrelation” in the idiosyncratic disturbance 𝑖𝑡. The p-
value of the AR(2) test needs to be greater than 0.05. If this is the case that “the null hypothesis” cannot 
be rejected, then we can confirm that there is no autocorrelation and  the lags used as instruments 
are appropriate. In this study, for equations (3.3) to (3.6), the Arrelano and Bond test is performed. 
Following Nguyen et al., (2014), this study performs several robustness checks to test if the initial 
results produced from equation (3.3) to equation (3.6) are consistent with alternative variables. First, 
EPS which represents firm profitability is replaced by ROA. Second, this study controls for firm growth 
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opportunity (sale growth) instead of firm profitability and further controls for macroeconomic factors 
(Infl). Subsection 4.4.5 presents the results of the robustness check performed in this study. 
3.7 Summary 
The dataset in this study is unbalanced panel data comprising 412 Vietnamese non-financial listed firms 
with 2,322 firm-year observations in 2010-2015. The study sample size is larger than previous studies 
for Vietnam’s stock market that examine the relationship between board structure and ownership 
structure, two important features of CG, and the financial performance of non-financial listed firms in 
Vietnam. 
This study uses Tobin’s Q, the most commonly used “market-based measures”, as firms’ financial 
performance to examine their link with board structure (including board size, board gender diversity, 
board independence, and board duality), and insider ownership (the percentage of insider ownership), 
and ownership concentration (the percentage of blockholder ownership). The study employs firm size, 
firm leverage, firm age, firm risk, firm profitability, the number of insiders owning shares, industry 
dummies and year dummies as control variables. 
In order to address the possible dynamic endogeneity problem when investigating the CG - financial 
performance relationship of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, this study employs the two-step 
SYS-GMM estimator with four dynamic models from equations (3.3) to (3.6). To justify the use of the 
SYS-GMM technique, we use the DHW test for the endogeneity of regressors. As suggested by 
Wooldridge (2001), the SYS-GMM estimator works more efficiently than the FE estimator in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. This study conducts the modified Wald test for 
“heteroscedasticity” and the Wooldridge test for “autocorrelation” of the sample to ensure that the 
SYS-GMM estimator is the suitable technique for the study.  
The tests that confirm the “validity of the GMM estimator” include (i) the Hansen-J test for “over-
identifying restrictions” that checks for “the validity of instruments” and the specification of the model, 




Empirical results  
Chapter 4 presents the empirical results of the study. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 
provides the data analysis which includes the descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, and multi-
collinearity diagnostic of the model variables. Section 4.2 presents the results of the pre-estimation 
tests of the study, including the DWH test for “endogeneity of the regressors”, the modified Wald test 
for “heteroscedasticity” and the Wooldridge test for “autocorrelation” of the data sample. Section 4.3 
provides the results of the specification tests of the SYS-GMM estimator, including the Arrelano and 
Bond test for “autocorrelation” and the Hansen-J test for “over-identifying restrictions”. Section 4.4 
presents the main empirical results of the study. Section 4.5 summarizes the chapter.  
4.1 Data analysis 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in this study. Tobin’s Q, which 
measures the financial performance of the non-financial listed firms of the sample data, ranges from 
the lowest value of 0.23 to the highest value of 5.84, with a mean value of 0.98 and a median value of 
0.91. Both the mean and median values of Tobin’s Q are slightly lower than one, which means the 
market value is lower than the book value but very close to the book value of the non-financial listed 
stocks in the study period 2010-2015. The average Tobin’s Q of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms 
in this study is higher than the mean value of Tobin’s Q (0.85) reported by Nguyen et al., (2015) during 
the period 2008-2011. This is reasonable as it reflects the rise of the Vietnam stock market after the 
2008 global financial crisis.   
The average board size is approximately 5.5 members for the Vietnamese non-financial listed firms of 
the sample data. This value is considerably lower than other Asian countries, such as Singapore (7.30), 
Malaysia (8.13), India (8.75), China (9.10), Taiwan (10.58), and Thailand (10.68) reported by Van Essen, 
Oosterhout, & Carney (2012). The minimum and maximum values of board size are 3 and 11 members, 
respectively, indicating the Vietnamese non-financial listed firms strictly follow the requirement of the 
CG Code (2007) which requires that the BODs may have no fewer than three and no more than eleven 
members. 
The mean ratio of female directors on the BODs is 12%, similar to the ratio reported by Nguyen et al., 
(2015).  According to an ADB report titled “Women’s leadership and corporate performance” published 
in 2016, the average percentage of women on the BODs of the Vietnamese non-financial listed firms 
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in this study is lower than Australia (18.2%) and New Zealand (14.8%), but considerably greater than 
other Asian countries, such as India (5.2%), China (8.5%), South Korea (1.9%), Japan (2%), Malaysia 
(8.6%), and Singapore (8.2%). 
The percentage of “non-executive directors” on the BODs accounts for 59% on average during the 
study period, which is higher than the ratio of 49% reported by Nguyen et al., (2015) for the 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms in 2007-2010. The higher percentage of “non-executive 
directors” for the period 2010-2015 in comparison with the period 2008-2011 indicates that 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms appear to actively react and increasingly follow the recent call 
for more independence on the board by the CG Code (2007). To encourage the independence of the 
board in Vietnamese listed firms, the CG Code (2007) requires that at least one third of the number of 
directors on the BODs should be “non-executive directors”. However, the minimum proportion of 
“non-executive directors” on the board observed in this study is zero, which means there are non-
financial listed firms that fail to comply with the requirement of the CG Code (2007). 
Duality leadership accounts for 35% among the Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, higher than the 
ratio of 32% reported by Nguyen et al., (2015) in their study period 2008-2011. This means the 
concentration of power in one person is not the most common practice among the Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms when nearly two thirds (65%) of the Vietnamese non-financial listed firms select 
to separate their chairperson and CEO titles. More importantly, the duality ratio gradually decreases 
year by year from 41.6% in 2010 to 39.7% in 2011, 37.1% in 2012, 33.5% in 2013, 32.1% in 2014, and 
29.5% in 2015. This reflects the trend of separating the chairman and CEO positions among the 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms during this study period of 2010-2015 following the call of CG 
Code (2007) to split these two key titles to increase the “check and balance” system. In comparison 
with other Asian countries, the duality ratio in the Vietnamese non-financial listed firms is lower than 
Hong Kong (43%), similar to Singapore (34%), but slightly higher than India (32%), China (30%), 
Malaysia (29%) reported by Van Essen et al., (2012).  
The mean percentage of insider ownership of the Vietnamese non-financial listed firms is 10%, lower 
than 30% in Singapore and 23% in Malaysia (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005), but slightly greater than 9.3% in 
China (Ruan, Tian, & Ma, 2011). The number of insiders owning shares of the non-financial listed firms 
is from 0 to 16 people. Meanwhile, the mean percentage of blockholder ownership of the Vietnamese 
non-financial listed firms is approximately 41%, slightly lower than the ratio of 44% reported by Nguyen 
et al., (2015) for the period 2008-2011. This ratio is considerably high in comparison with that of the 
U.S (11.7%) and the UK (7.5%) reported by Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist (2006), but considerably lower 
than Malaysia (47%) and Singapore (60%) reported by Mak & Kusnadi (2005). This indicates that in 
comparison with the U.S and the UK, the ownership concentration of the Vietnamese non-financial 
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listed firms is relatively high. However, the ownership concentration of the Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms may not be as high as those in the Asian region. Blockholder ownership varies significantly 
among the Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, from 0% to 98%. 
Firm size measured by “the market value of the firm’s equity” ranges from 3.8 billion (166 thousand 
USD) to 154,000 billion VND (6.73 billion USD) with a mean value of 816 billion VND (35.62 million USD) 
of our sample. According to the listing rules, to be eligible for listing the shares in the Vietnam stock 
exchange, one of the listing conditions is that a firm must have the book value of at least 10 billion 
VND. The minimum market value of equity of 3.8 billion VND in this study shows several non-financial 
listed firms with market values much lower than the minimum book value eligible for listing. The 
average firm leverage is equal to 0.52. This ratio shows that 52% of the total assets of the Vietnamese 
non-financial listed firms is financed by debt. Leverage ranges largely from 0% to 97%. “The standard 
deviation of daily stock returns” which represents the market risk has a mean value of 0.03. This means 
the average daily volatility of the listed stocks of our sample is 3%.  
The profitability of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms measured by earning per share ratio (EPS) 
averages approximately 1,750 VND. The EPS ranges from a minimum value of -10,300 VND to a 
maximum value of 13,600 VND. The negative EPS value indicates several non-financial listed firms in 
the sample generate negative profits during the study period. The average age of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms is approximately 6 years. This is reasonable since the Vietnam stock market started 
its operation in 2000, only ten years before the study period.  
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study 
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max 
Tobin’s Q 2322 0.98 0.91 0.37 0.23 5.84 
Board size 2322 5.47 5.00 1.08 3.00 11.00 
Percentage of female 
directors 
2322 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.71 
Percentage of non 
executive directors 
2322 0.59 0.60 0.18 0.00 100.00 
Board Duality 2322 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Insider Ownership 2320 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.96 
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Blockholder Ownership 2093 0.41 0.44 0.23 0.00 0.98 
No. of insiders owning 
shares 
2320 6.12 6.00 3.11 0.00 16.00 
Size (billion VND) 2322 816.00 144.00 5,150 3.80 154,000 
Leverage 2322 0.52 0.56 0.22 0.00 0.97 
StdDev 2322     0.03     0.03     0.01      0.00    0.06 
Profitability (VND) 2315         1739.40 1467.86 1970.48    -10334.06   13629.49 
Age 2322 5.67 5.00 2.49 1.00 16.00 
Souce: Author’s calculation  
4.1.2 Correlation matrix and multi-collinearity diagnostic 
Table 4.2 shows the correlation matrix of variables of the study. The Table shows the correlation 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are less than 0.8, meaning there is no “multi-collinearity” 
problem among the regressors (Damodar, 2004; Gujarati, 2008).  
Another check for “multi-collinearity” is the “variance inflation factors” (VIFs) of the explanatory 
variables used in equations (3.3) to (3.6). It is observed in Table 4.3 that all VIFs are “under the 
acceptable cut-off point of 10” recommended by Chatterjee & Hadi (2012), meaning the problem of 
multi-collinearity is not present in this study. 
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Table 4.2 Pair-wise correlation coefficients 
 BS FD NED DUAL INSDO BLHO NoInsd Lev Size StdDev Proft ROA Growth lnAge 
BS 1.00              
FD 0.05** 1.00             
NED 0.09*** -0.06*** 1.00            
DUAL 0.00 0.07*** -0.37*** 1.00           
INSDO 0.07*** 0.10*** -0.07*** 0.16*** 1.00          
BLHO -0.10*** -0.03* 0.04 -0.12*** -0.05** 1.00         
NoInsd 0.18*** -0.04* 0.06*** -0.00 0.28*** -0.02 1.00        
Lev -0.00 -0.18*** -0.10*** -0.03 0.10*** 0.03 0.13*** 1.00       
Size 0.33*** 0.06*** 0.18*** -0.11*** -0.05** 0.11*** 0.15*** -0.04** 1.00      
StdDev -0.17*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 0.09*** 0.05** -0.06*** -0.09*** 0.16*** -0.48*** 1.00     
Proft 0.04* 0.05** -0.02 0.01 -0.09*** 0.08*** 0.03 -0.18*** 0.35*** -0.27*** 1.00    
ROA 0.05** 0.11*** 0.02 0.02 -0.11*** 0.05** -0.02 -0.45*** 0.31*** -0.29*** 0.76*** 1.00   
Growth 0.00 0.01 0.04* -0.02 0.00 -0.04** -0.05** -0.01 0.03 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 1.00  
lnAge 0.07*** 0.00 0.12*** -0.14*** -0.08*** 0.07*** 0.10*** -0.00 0.18*** -0.20*** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.02 1.00 




Table 4.3 Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) of the explanatory variables 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
4.2 Pre-estimation Tests  
This section presents the results of the DWH test for the “endogeneity of the regressors”, the modified 
Wald test for “heteroscedasticity” and the Wooldridge test for “autocorrelation” of the sample. They 











Size  1.87 
Lev 1.16 
StdDev 1.37     




4.2.1 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the endogeneity of the regressors  
As discussed in chapter 3, the “endogeneity of the regressors” is a matter of concern among scholars 
while examining the relationship between CG and firm financial performance (Wintoki et al., 2012; 
and Schultz al., 2010). The “endogeneity problem” occurs when “the explanatory variables correlate 
with the error term” in the model, resulting in bias and inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Schultz et al., (2010, p157) suggests that if the variables are “exogenous”, the OLS and FE estimators 
“will produce the parameter estimates that are more efficient than their dynamic GMM counterpart”. 
However, if the endogeneity of variables is present, the GMM approach is the more appropriate 
technique to overcome the “endogeneity problem” (Wintoki et al., 2012, Schultz al., 2010). Therefore, 
in order to justify the use of the GMM technique, it is important to ensure that the endogeneity of 
variables actually exists. This study conducts the DWH test to check for the presence of “the 
endogeneity of the regressors” of equations (3.3) to (3.6).  
Table 4.4 shows the results of the DWH test. In all the four models, “the null hypothesis” is rejected 
at any significance levels. This means the suspected endogenous variables in the tests should be 
treated as endogenous. Hence, the DWH test results suggest that the GMM estimator is the 
appropriate technique for the present study. 
Table 4.4 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity of variables 
 
Ho: Regressors are exogenous 
Equation (3.3) Equation (3.4) Equation (3.5) Equation (3.6) 
χ2 statistic χ2(9) = 31.46 χ2(9)  = 34.99 χ2(9) = 33.68 χ2(12)= 37.78 
P-Value 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
Source: Author’s calculation 
4.2.2 The modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity and the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation 
Wooldridge (2002) suggests that in the presence of “heteroscedasticity” and “autocorrelation”, the 
GMM approach works more efficiently than the FE estimator. In this study, for equations (3.3) to (3.6), 
I carry out the modified Wald test to test for “heteroscedasticity” and the Wooldridge test for 
“autocorrelation” of our panel data.  
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Table 4.5 shows the results of the modified Wald test for “heteroscedasticity” and the Wooldridge 
test for “autocorrelation” of the sample data. The results indicate that for both the modified Wald test 
and Wooldridge test, “the null hypothesis” is rejected at a 1% level of significance which means 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are present in the sample data. Therefore, according to 
Wooldridge (2001), the GMM technique is better than the FE estimator to estimate the relationship 
between CG and the firms’ financial performance in the presence of “heteroscedasticity” and 
“autocorrelation” of the data sample. In addition, according to Roodman (2009a), in the presence of 
“heteroscedasticity”, the two-step SYS-GMM with Winmeijer finite sample correction is more efficient 
than the one-step SYS-GMM. Hence, the two-step SYS-GMM is employed in this study. 
Table 4.5 The modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity and the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation 
 Equation (3.3) Equation (3.4) Equation (3.5) Equation (3.6) 
Modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity (Ho: homoscedasticity) 
χ2 statistic χ2(412)=6400000 χ2(412)=550000 χ2(412)=6500000 χ2(412)=930000 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wooldridge test for autocorelation ( Ho: no autocorrelation) 
F statistic F(1, 410)=291.83 F(1, 410)= 284.55 F(1, 407)=186.32 F(1, 407)= 183.53 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: Author’s calculation   
4.3 Specification Tests of the SYS-GMM estimator  
This section presents the results of the specification tests of the SYS-GMM estimator for equations 
(3.3) to (3.6). The specification tests, including the Arrelano and Bond test for “autocorrelation” and 
the Hansen-J test for “over-identifying restrictions”, are vital to confirm “the validity of the SYS-GMM 
estimates” in this study. 
Table 4.6 shows the specification tests of the SYS-GMM estimator. The AR(1) tests report z-statistics 
which are negative with p-value = 0.000 in equations (3.3) to (3.6),  which means the serial correlation 
of the first-order in difference AR(1) is present as suggested by Arrelano & Bond (1991). Meanwhile, 
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the AR(2) test reveals the p-values are greater than 0.1 in equations (3.3) to (3.6) (p-values are 0.178, 
0.182, 0.274, 0.123, respectively). This indicates that the “serial correlation in the second-order of the 
diosyncratic disturbance in differences” AR(2) is not present, thus there is no autocorrelation in the 
first-order in the levels of the diosyncratic disturbance. In addition, according to Roodman (2009b), 
lags of the order of two or higher in levels are valid to use as the instruments in the differenced 
equations. This study follows Wintoki et al., (2012) to use lags 3 and 4 of levels as the instruments in 
the “differenced equations”. The results of the AR(2) tests suggest that the lags of the order of 3 to 4 
are valid instruments in equations (3.3) to (3.6).  
The Hansen-J test results reported in Table 4.6 shows the J-statistics are 17.09 with p-value = 0.314 in 
equation (3.3), 12.35 with p-value = 0.653 in equation (3.4), 12.62 with p-value = 0.632 in equation 
(3.5), and 13.50 with p-value = 0.890 in equation (3.6). The p-values of the test for all equations are 
greater than 0.1, indicating that “the null hypothesis” of valid instruments cannot be rejected. In other 
words, all instruments as a group used in equations (3.3) to (3.6) are exogenous and valid and all the 
models are specified. Further, the Difference-in-Hansen test to check for “the exogeneity of 
instrument subsets” is also carried out in this study. The Difference-in-Hansen test results show all p-
values of the test are larger than 0.1. This means all “instrument subsets” i.e, “GMM instruments” for 
levels and “IV instruments” are exogenous.  
In addition, Roodman (2009b) suggested that in the SYS-GMM estimator, “the number of instruments” 
should be smaller than “the number of groups” (the number of listed firms in this study) to ensure 
that the SYS-GMM estimator works efficiently. Table 4.6 also reports “the number of groups” and “the 
number of instruments” and it shows “the number of instruments” is fewer than “the number of 
groups” in equations (3.3) to (3.6), thus the concern of too many instruments is not an issue in this 
study. 
In conclusion, all the specification tests strongly provide support for the SYS-GMM estimator and verify 
the validity of instruments used in this study. Although this study reports the empirical results 
generated by the SYS-GMM technique as well as the OLS and FE estimators for comparison purposes, 
the results of the SYS-GMM estimator are the main focus of this study. Schultz et al., (2010, p.157) 
recommends that “in the presence of endogeneity, the OLS and fixed-effects panel estimation 
approachs will produce biased parameter estimates, while those of dynamic GMM panel models will 





Table 4.6 Specification Tests of the SYS-GMM estimator 
 Equation 3.3 Equation 3.4 Equation 3.5 Equation 3.6 
Arrelano and Bond test for autocorrelation 
AR(1) in first differences 
(p-value) 
z = -4.96             
p-value=0.000 
z = -4.44           
p-value=0.000 
z = -4.79           
p-value=0.000 
z = -4.97           
p-value=0.000 
AR(2) in first differences 
(p-value) 
z = -1.35           
p-value=0.178 
z = -1.33         
p-value=0.182 
z = -1.09           
p-value=0.274 
z = -1.54          
p-value=0.123 
Hansen-J test for over-identifying restrictions 












    
-GMM instruments for 
levels 
0.699 0.647 0.695 0.905 
-IV 0.151 0.521 0.461 0.668 
Number of groups 412 412 412 412 
Number of instruments 41 41 41 50 
Source: Author’s calculation 
4.4 Empirical results   
4.4.1 Impact of board structure on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms  
The impact of board structure on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms 
is reported in Table 4.7. Columns (2), (3), and (4) in Table 4.7 provide the results obtained from 
dynamic equation (3.3) using the  OLS, FE and SYS-GMM estimators, respectively.  
The F statistic of the overall significance test in all the three estimators is significant at the 1% level. 
This shows strong evidence of rejecting the null hypothesis of jointly-equal-to-zero of all estimated 
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coefficients. In other words, equation (3.3) provides a better fit than the equation with constant only 
or it indicates the overall significance of our equation (3.3) (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2011). 
The result shows R2 is 0.714 in the OLS estimator and 0.665 in the FE estimator. The R2 indicates the 
explanatory power of the empirical models. In comparison with previous studies in the governance 
literature (such as Wintoki et al., (2012), Schultz et al., (2010), Mak & Kusnadi (2005), and Demsetz & 
Villalonga (2001)), the value of R2 observed in this study is relatively high. Although the results 
obtained from the OLS and FE estimators are not the focus of this study, the high value of R2 indicates 
that there may be no problem with the selection of the independent variables in terms of explanatory 
power. For the SYS-GMM estimator, the R2 is not applicable. 
The results from the dynamic OLS and FE estimators are reported to facilitate comparison in using the 
OLS and FE estimators to the SYS-GMM technique. Bond (2002) suggests that the comparison of 
estimates obtained from the SYS-GMM and those from the OLS and FE estimators should be made to 
discover possible biases in estimations. Specifically, Bond (2002) suggests that the estimated 
coefficients of the “lagged dependent variable” from the SYS-GMM estimator should be higher than 
those obtained from the FE estimator, but lower than those obtained from the OLS estimator. This is 
explained by Nickell (1981) that the OLS estimator generates upward bias and inconsistency in 
estimates under the first-order autocorrelation AR(1) since the “lagged dependent variable” is 
correlated with the specific firm fixed effects contained in the error term of equation (3.3). The FE 
estimator, meanwhile, would produce downward bias and inconsistency in estimates (Nickell, 1981). 
Bond (2002) suggests that in order to confirm the SYS-GMM as a reasonably applied estimation, the 
SYS-GMM estimator needs to generate the estimated coefficient of the “lagged dependent variable” 
in the range of the upper bound produced by the OLS estimator and lower bound produced by the FE 
estimator. Nguyen et al.,(2015) further suggest that this comparison of estimates is helpful to identify 
whether the SYS-GMM is well-specified.  
Table 4.7 indicates that the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (L.lnQ) is significant 
at the 1% level in all the three estimators, indicating the use of the dynamic equation to examine the 
CG - financial performance relationship is appropriate as suggested by Wintoki et al., (2012). In other 
words, it confirms that “past performance is significant in explaining current performance, suggestive 
of the presence of dynamic endogeneity” (Schultz et al., 2010, p. 160). More importantly, the 
estimated coefficient of L.lnQ obtained from the SYS-GMM estimator is 0.439 (𝜃= 0.439), ranged 
between the upper bound produced by the OLS estimator (𝜃 = 0.688) and the lower bound produced 
by the FE estimator (𝜃 = 0.082) as expected. According to Bond (2002), this indicates that the SYS-
GMM seems to be a reasonably applied estimator in this study. According to Schultz et al., (2010, p. 
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157), the “OLS and FE panel estimation will produce biased parameter estimates in the presence of 
dynamic endogeneity”. Thus, the results generated from the OLS and FE estimators will not be 
interpreted in this study. 
Column (4) in Table 4.7 reports the estimated coefficients of board structure using the SYS-GMM 
estimator. The percentage of “non-executive directors” (NED) and duality (DUAL) significantly and 
negatively influence the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. Specifically, 
NED is negatively related to lnQ (estimated coefficent 𝛽3 = -0.591, t-value = -3.04) and significant at 
the 1% level. Meanwhile, lnQ is negatively affected by DUAL (estimated coefficent 𝛽4 = -0.140, t-value 
= -1.79) and significant at the 10% level. However, board size (BS) and board gender diversity (FD) have 
no effects on the firms’ financial performance. Specifically, BS is insignificant and positively related to 
lnQ (estimated coefficent 𝛽1 = 0.021, t-value = 0.08). FD is insignificant but negatively related to lnQ 
(estimated coefficent 𝛽2 = -0.054, t-value = -0.22).  
Interestingly, DUAL is significant and negatively influences lnQ in the SYS-GMM and FE estimators, but 
it is significant and positively relates to lnQ in the OLS estimator. Meanwhile, NED is negatively related 
to lnQ in all the three estimators, but only significant in the SYS-GMM estimator. This is because the 
estimates of the OLS estimator are biased due to the endogeneity problem. Specifically, the 
simultaneity endogeneity is not addressed by the OLS estimator. In addition, “unobserved 
heterogeneity endogeneity” caused by the correlation between both the firms’ financial performance 
and governance variables and unobservable firm specific components is not addressed by the OLS 
estimator (Wintoki et al., 2012; Roberts & Whited, 2013). Furthermore, the OLS estimates are “biased 
and inconsistent” when the “lagged dependent variable” (L.lnQ) is included in equation (3.3) as 
suggested by Wooldridge (2002). In the FE estimator, although unobservable firm specific components 
are eliminated, the dynamic endogeneity caused by the correlation between the “lagged dependent 
variable” (L.lnQ) and the error term is still unresolved (Bond, 2002). Therefore, the FE estimator still 
produces biased results. The sign of the estimated coefficients of BS or FD changes as I move from the 
OLS and FE estimators to the SYS-GMM estimator. This change of the sign of the estimated coefficients 
while moving from the OLS and FE estimators to the GMM estimator is termed by Wintoki et al., (2012) 
as “sign flip”. Wintoki et al., (2012, p.596) suggest that  this sign flip “illustrates the bias that may arise 
from ignoring both unobservable heterogeneity and dynamic relationship” between governance and 
firm performance.  
The result produced by the SYS-GMM estimator shows that lnQ is negatively related to NED (estimated 
coefficent 𝛽3 = -0.591, t-value = -3.04) and significant at the 1% level. This result supports my 
hypothesis (3), that the percentage of “non-executive directors” as the proxy for board independence 
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negatively influences the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. The 
coefficent 𝛽3 = -0.591 implies that if the proportion of non-executive directors increases by one 
percent point, then Tobin’s Q will decrease by 0.59 percent on average, ceteris paribus. This finding is 
consistent with Ammari et al., (2014) and Aroara & Sharma (2016). Employing the SYS-GMM 
estimator, both Ammari et al., (2014) and Aroara & Sharma (2016) find that Tobin’s Q is negatively 
affected by board independence in French and Indian firms, respectively. Our finding is also consistent 
with the findings of several previous studies based on Vietnam’s data. For example, Adhikary & Le 
(2014) study 58 large firms listed on the HSX over the period 2007-2009 and report an adverse 
correlation between board independence and the firms’ performance measured by ROE and ROA. 
Similarly, To (2011) analyses the 100 largest firms in the year 2009 and find an inverse effect of board 
independence on Tobin’s Q. Dao & Hoang (2014) examine 30 listed firms of VNindex 30 in the year 
2012 and suggest that board independence adversely influences the firms’ performamce measured 
by ROE. The negative effect of board independence on firm performance may be explained by the 
limited pool of “independent directors” available in developing countries (Aroara & Sharma, 2016; 
Nguyen et al., 2014). For Vietnamese firms, due to the limited source of “independent director” 
candidates, it is difficult for listed firms to select appropriate people to contribute effectively as their 
“independent directors”. Meanwhile, the firms need to bear the costs of hiring them. Therefore, the 
efficiency of board independence may not be able to offset the cost of having them as “non-executive 
directors” in Vietnamese listed firms. In addition, according to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), in a majority 
of emerging countries, the appointment of “independent directors” is made for political connections, 
and for relationship consolidation, instead of the expertise contributions. This view is also shared by 
Flanagan (1982) who indicates that even in the U.S, 80% of independent director candidates before 
being appointed as “independent directors”, are known by the CEO or “inside directors” of the firms. 
This implies that the independence of “independent directors” may be a significant problem. As a 
consequence, the firms’ performance may not rely much on the participation of “the independent 
directors” on the board.  
Column (4) in Table 4.7 shows that  lnQ is negatively affected by DUAL (estimated coefficent 𝛽4 = -
0.140, t-value = -1.79) and significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Ammari et al., (2014), Benjamin & Ehikioya (2009) and Chang (2004) in the French, Nigerian and 
Malaysian stock markets, respectively. This result is also consistent with Dao & Hoang (2014) who find 
that the separation between the CEO and chairman positions leads to better financial performance 
measured by ROA for Vietnamese listed firms in VNindex 30. This study follows the explanation of  
Fama & Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) who suggest that duality may decrease the monitoring of 
the board over the managers of the firms and the split may facilitate the effectiveness of the “check 
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and balance” system by the board and CEO of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, leading to better 
financial performance.             
Table 4.7 Impact of board structure on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms  
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q [lnQ] 
(1)  (2) 
OLS 
     (3) 
Fixed Effects 









































































Industry Dummies Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 1,905 1,905 1,905 
Number of groups  412 412 
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Number of instruments   41 
𝐑𝟐 0.714 0.665  
F statistic F(22,1882)=213.64 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(14,1479)=209.47 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(25,411)=22.95 
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
AR(1) (p-value)   0.000 
AR(2) (p-value)   0.178 
Hansen-J test of over-
identification (p-value) 
  0.314 
Note: t-statistic in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.4.2 Impact of insider ownership on the financial performance of Vietnamese 
non-financial listed firms  
Table 4.8 presents the impact of insider ownership on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms. Columns (2), (3), and (4) in Table 4.8 provide the results produced by the dynamic 
equation (3.4) using the OLS, FE and SYS-GMM estimators, respectively.  
Similarly to equation (3.3), the F statistic of the overall significance test in all the three estimators is 
significant at the 1% level. This shows strong evidence of the overall significance of equation (3.4) (Hill 
et al., 2011). 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.8 indicate that R2 is 0.715 in the OLS estimator and 0.666 in the FE 
estimator. Similarly to equation (3.3), the relatively high value of R2 compared to previous studies in 
the governance literature indicates the explanatory power of equation (3.4) is relatively good in the 
OLS and FE estimators.  
Similarly to equation (3.3), Table 4.8 shows the estimated coefficient of “the lagged dependent 
variable” (L.lnQ) is significant at the 1% level in all three estimators. This supports the suggestion of 
Wintoki et al., (2012) and Schultz et al., (2010) of a dynamic relationship between CG and financial 
performance. The estimated coefficient of L.lnQ obtained from the SYS-GMM estimator is 0.428 (𝜃= 
0.428), which is lower than those yielded by the OLS estimator (𝜃 = 0.690) and higher than those 
generated by the FE estimator (𝜃 = 0.082) as expected. This indicates the SYS-GMM is a reasonably 
applied estimator in this study as recommended by Bond (2002).  
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Regarding the estimated coefficients of INSDO and 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑂2, the results obtained from all three 
estimators including the OLS, FE and SYS-GMM show the relation between insider ownership and the 
financial performance of non-financial listed firms is an inverted U-shape. In all the three estimators, 
the estimated coefficient of INSDO (𝛽1) is significantly positive and the estimated coefficient of 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑂2 (𝛽2) is significantly negative. Specifically, the OLS estimator, 𝛽1 ( 0.128) with a t-value of 1.72, 
is significant at the 10% level, and 𝛽2 (-0.311) with a t-value of -2.21, is significant at the 5% level. The 
FE estimator, 𝛽1 (0.290) with a t-value of 3.32, is significant at the 1% level, and 𝛽2 (-0.312) with a t-
value of -2.05, is significant at the 5% level. In the SYS-GMM estimator, 𝛽1 (1.100) with a t-value of 
1.76, is significant at the 10% level and 𝛽2 (-1.792) with a t-value of -2.12, is significant at the 5% level. 
The result from all the three estimators supports hypothesis (5), that the relationship between insider 
ownership and the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms is an inverted U-
shape. In this study, the coefficient estimates of INSDO and 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑂2 of all the three estimators 
indicate that both “convergence of interest and entrenchment hypotheses” of insider ownership are 
established. The financial performance increases at the low level of insider ownership to a certain 
point, after that the financial performance decreases. This result is consistent with the findings of Stulz 
(1988), McConnell & Seraes (1990), Hermalin & Weisbach (1991), and Han & Suk (1998). This supports 
the arguments of  Stulz (1988), McConnell & Seraes (1990), and Han & Suk (1998) that at the low level 
of insider ownership, the interest of managers and officers of the firms is aligned with the interest of 
the shareholders. However, when the insiders have shareholdings that are high enough, they appear 
to become entrenched. The turning point, at which the financial performance starts to decrease, is 
calculated by the following equation:  
turning point = -𝛽1/2*𝛽2             (4.1)  
Based on equation (4.1) , for the SYS-GMM estimator, the turning point is 30% (= -𝛽1/2*𝛽2 = 1.100/(-
2)*(-1.792) = 30), which means lnQ is positively linked with insider ownership up to the point of 30% 
of insider ownership. As insider ownership is over 30%, lnQ becomes negatively related  with insider 
ownership. 
In equation (3.4), NED is included as a control variable to control for the effect of board structure on 
financial performance. Column (4) in Table 4.8 shows that similar to equation (3.3), NED is still 
significant and negatively impacts lnQ. The coefficient of the number of insiders (NoInsd) is negative 
but insignificantly related to lnQ. The control variables such as firm size (Size), firm leverage (Lev) , and 
firm proftability (Proft), which are significant and positively associated with lnQ in equation (3.3), are 
still significant and positively related to lnQ in equation (3.4). StdDev, similar to equation (3.3), is 
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positive but insignificantly associated with lnQ. Meanwhile, firm age (lnAge) is still negative but 
insignificantly related to lnQ.  
Table 4.8 Impact of insider ownership on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms  
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q [lnQ] 
(1)  (2) 
OLS 
     (3) 
Fixed Effects 










































































Industry Dummies Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 1,904 1,904 1,904 
Number of groups  412 412 
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𝐑𝟐 0.715 0.666  
F statistic F(22,1881)=214.08 
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
F(14,1478)=210.07 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(25,411)=32.91 
Prob > F = 0.000 
Number of instruments   41 
AR(1) (p-value)   0.000 
AR(2) (p-value)   0.182 
Hansen-J test of over-
identification (p-value) 
  0.653 
Note: t-statistic in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.4.3 Impact of ownership concentration on the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms  
Table 4.9 presents the effects of ownership concentration on the financial performance of Vietnamese 
non-financial listed firms. Columns (2), (3), and (4) in Table 4.9 report the results generated by 
equation (3.5) using the OLS, FE and SYS-GMM estimators, respectively.  
Similarly to equations (3.3) and (3.4), the F statistic in all the three estimators is significant at the 1% 
level, indicating strong evidence of the overall significance of equation (3.5). 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.9 show that R2 is 0.715 in the OLS estimator and 0.662 in the FE 
estimator, indicating the explanatory power of equation (3.5) is relatively good in both the OLS and FE 
estimators compared to previous studies in the governance literature.  
The estimated coefficient of the “lagged dependent variable” (L.lnQ) is significant at the 1% level in all 
the three estimators, confirming the dynamic relationship between CG and financial performance. As 
expected, the estimated coefficient of L.lnQ obtained by using the SYS-GMM estimator is 0.393 (𝜃= 
0.393), which is lower than 0.689 (𝜃 = 0.689) produced by the OLS estimator and higher than 0.082 (𝜃 
= 0.082) generated by the FE estimator. This indicates that the SYS-GMM is a reasonable estimator in 
this study.  
Regarding the estimated coefficients of BLHO, 𝐵𝐿𝐻𝑂2 and 𝐵𝐿𝐻𝑂3, the results obtained by the OLS 
estimator in column (2) in Table 4.9 show the cubic relation between ownership concentration and 
the firms’ performance. The estimated coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽3 are significantly positive, while 𝛽2 is 
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significantly negative. Specifically, 𝛽1 (0.309) with a t-value of 2.62,  is significant at the 1% level, 𝛽2 (-
0.826) with a t-value of -2.46, is significant at the 5% level, and 𝛽3 (0.640) with a t-value of 2.41, is 
significant at the 5% level. When I move from the OLS estimator to the FE estimator as shown in 
column (3) in Table 4.9, 𝛽1,  𝛽2 and 𝛽3 do not change their signs but they become insignificant. This is 
because the dynamic endogeneity is not controlled in the FE estimator. When employing the SYS-
GMM estimator which allows for controlling the dynamic endogeneity, the estimated coefficients of 
BLHO, 𝐵𝐿𝐻𝑂2, and 𝐵𝐿𝐻𝑂3 in column (4) in Table 4.9 show the cubic relationship between ownership 
concentration and the financial performance. Specifically, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 are 2.314 (with a t-value of 
2.17),  -6.427 (with a t-value of -2.44), and 4.928 (with a t-value of 2.40), respectively, are significant 
at the 5% level. The result produced by the SYS-GMM estimator supports hypothesis (6), that there is 
a cubic relationship between ownership concentration and the financial performance of Vietnamese 
non-financial listed firms. The firms’ financial performance increases at low and high levels of 
ownership concentration and decreases at the intermediate level of ownership concentration. The 
finding of this study is consistent with the findings of De Miguel et al., (2004) and Thomsen & Pedersen 
(2000) who find both convergence and expropriation effects of ownership concentration on firms’ 
financial performance. These studies find the financial performance increases at the low level and 
decreases at the high level of ownership concentration (an inverted U-shaped relationship), but this 
study finds that the financial performance increases at the low level and then starts to decrease until 
the level of ownership concentration reaches a certain point, at which the financial performance starts 
to increase again (a cubic relationship).  The turning points are calculated as follows:  
The first turning point = 
−2𝛽2− √4𝛽2 2−12𝛽1 𝛽3 
6𝛽3
                                           (4.2) 
The second turning point = 
−2𝛽2+ √4𝛽2 2−12𝛽1 𝛽3 
6𝛽3
                                       (4.3) 
Based on equations (4.2) and (4.3), for the SYS-GMM estimator, I calculate the first and second turning 
points as 25% and 61%, respectively. This means lnQ is positively linked with the percentage of 
blockholder ownership if the percentage of blockholder ownership is lower than 25% or higher than 
61%.  If the percentage of blockholder ownership ranges from 25% to 61%, lnQ is negatively associated 
with the percentage of blockholder ownership. At the low level of blockholder ownership (lower than 
25% ownership), the convergence effect prevails as the interest of the blockholders is aligned with the 
shareholders. Blockholders, who have stronger incentives to monitor firms (Holderness, 2003) and 
have more information and power to monitor management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), would 
contribute to ensure the managers pursue the shareholders’ benefit. Therefore, the financial 
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performance increases with the increase in blockholder ownership. If the blockholder ownership is 
over 25%, the expropriation effect of blockholder ownership on the firms’ financial performance 
prevails. The firms’ financial performance decreases since blockholders are likely to follow their own 
goals and expropriate the minority shareholders’ benefit (Fama & Jensen, 1983; and Morck et al., 
1988). However, if blockholder ownership reaches 61%, the firms’ financial performance increases 
again as blockholder ownership increases. This may be because in Vietnam, the State remains a large 
blockholder in many previously State-owned firms. The firms with large State ownership often enjoy 
a number of benefits, such as access to preferential loans, and access to changes in the industry 
development policies. Therefore, their competitiveness is higher than other firms and gives them 
advantages in making profits. 
Column (4) in Table 4.9 shows that similarly to equations (3.3) and (3.4), NED as a control variable is 
still significant and negatively associated with lnQ.  Firm size (Size), firm leverage (Lev) , and firm 
proftability (Proft) which are significant and positively associated with lnQ in equations (3.3) and (3.4), 
are still significant and positively related to lnQ in equation (3.5). StdDev and lnAge are insignificant 
but positively and negatively associated with lnQ, respectively. 
Table 4.9 Impact of ownership concentration on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms  
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q [lnQ] 
(1)  (2) 
OLS 
       (3) 
Fixed Effects 










































































Industry Dummies Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 1,890 1,890 1,890 
Number of stocks 412 412 412 
𝐑𝟐 0.715 0.662  
F statistic F(22,1867)=212.69 
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
F(14,1464)=204.35 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(25,411)=4.87 
Prob > F = 0.000 
Number of instruments   41 
AR(1) (p-value)   0.000 
AR(2) (p-value)   0.274 
Hansen-J test of over-
identification (p-value) 
  0.632 
Note: t-statistic in parentheses. ***. **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.4.4 Impact of insider ownership and ownership concentration on the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms  
With regards to the ownership structure variables, insider and blockholder ownership are included in 
one unified model to investigate the effect of one factor while controlling the impact of the other 
factor on firms' financial performance. Table 4.10 shows the impact of INSDO and BLHO on lnQ with 
the other factors controlled for. Columns (2), (3), and (4) in Table 4.10 provide the results from 
equation (3.6) using the OLS, FE and SYS-GMM estimators, respectively.  
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Similarly to equations (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5), the F statistic in all three estimators is significant at the 
1% level, indicating the overall significance of equation (3.6). The R2 in the OLS and FE estimators are 
0.716 and 0.665, respectively, showing the relatively good explanatory power of equation (3.6) in the 
OLS and FE estimators.  
The estimated coefficient of “the lagged dependent variable” (L.lnQ) is significant at the 1% level in all 
the three estimators, thus the relationship between CG and financial performance is dynamic. As 
expected, the estimated coefficient of L.lnQ obtained from the SYS-GMM estimator is 0.438 (𝜃= 
0.438), which is lower than 0.689 (𝜃 = 0.689) produced by the OLS estimator and higher than 0.081 (𝜃 
= 0.081) generated by the FE estimator. This indicates that the SYS-GMM is a reasonable estimator in 
this study. 
Regarding insider ownership, similarly to equation (3.4), the relationship between INSDO and lnQ is 
an inverted U-shape in all the three estimators when we control for blockholder ownership. Column 
(4) in Table 4.10 reports the results obtained from the SYS-GMM estimator. The turning point is around 
30%, relatively equal to those produced by equation (3.4) reported in subsection 4.4.2. The 
significance levels of INSDO and 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑂2 are improved from 10% and 5% in equation (3.4) to 5% and 
1% in equation (3.6), respectively. 
Table 4.10 also indicates that while controlling for INSDO, the relationship between BLHO and lnQ is a 
cubic relationship using the OLS and SYS-GMM estimators, which is similar to equation (3.5). The 
coefficients of BLHO, 𝐵𝐿𝐻𝑂2 and 𝐵𝐿𝐻𝑂3 are significant at the 5% level. The turning points are 26% 
and 59%, relatively similar to equation (3.5) except for the second turning point (59%) which is lower 
than 61% in equation (3.5). This means controlling for insider ownership in equation (3.6) might be 
necessary since both insider and blockholder ownerships do impact lnQ.  
In equation (3.6), column (4) in Table 4.10 shows the signs of the other parameters are unchanged 
compared to equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5). NED is significant and negatively associated with lnQ, 
similarly to equations (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5). Firm size (Size) and firm profitability (Proft), significant and 
positively associated with lnQ in equations (3.3) to (3.5), are still significant and positively related to 
lnQ in equation (3.6). Lev and StdDev are insignificant and positively related to lnQ, and lnAge and 





Table 4.10 Impact of insider ownership and ownership concentration on the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms  
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q [lnQ] 
(1)  (2) 
OLS 
       (3) 
Fixed Effects 


































































































Industry Dummies Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
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Number of obs. 1,889 1,889 1,889 
Number of groups  412 412 
𝐑𝟐 0.716 0.665  
F statistic F(25,1863)=188.20 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(17,1460)=171.33 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(28,411)=54.23 
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
Number of instruments   50 
AR(1) (p-value)   0.000 
AR(2) (p-value)   0.123 
Hansen-J test of over-
identification (p-value) 
  0.890 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
4.4.5 Robustness check  
To check the robustness of the results obtained from equations (3.3) to (3.6) (see Tables (4.7) to 
(4.10)), this study employs the SYS-GMM estimator, using ROA as the alternative for EPS to represent 
firm profitability in equations (3.3) to (3.6). Table 4.11 shows the relationship between all the 
dependent variables (BS, FD, NED, DUAL, INSDO and BLHO) and lnQ remain unchanged from equations 
(3.3) to (3.6). Specifically, BS and FD have no effects on lnQ. Meanwhile, NED and DUAL negatively 
impact lnQ. The relationship between insider ownership and lnQ is an inverted U-shape, while 
blockholder ownership and lnQ form a cubic relationship.  
Table 4.11 Robustness check of the SYS-GMM estimator using ROA as the alternative measure 
for EPS to represent firm profitability  
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q [lnQ] 
(1)        (2) 
Equation (3.3) 
       (3) 
Equation (3.4) 
      (4) 
Equation (3.5) 


































   

















































































Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Number of obs. 1,905 1,904 1,890 1,889 
Number of groups 412 412 412 412 
F statistic F(25,411)=36.97 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(25,411)=46.11 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(25,411)=51.75 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(28,411)=40.89 
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
Number of instruments 41 41 41 50 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.363 0.369 0.398 0.224 
Hansen-J test of over-
identification (p-value) 
0.360 0.626 0.709 0.937 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
From equations (3.3) to (3.6), ROA is used as the alternative measure for EPS to represent firm 
profitability. The SYS-GMM is used in all equations. 
 
To check the robustness of the results, this study employs firm growth opportunity measured by 
annual net sale growth (Growth) of non-financial listed firms as the alternative for firm profitability. 
In addition, I include inflation rate (Infl) in equations (3.3) to (3.6) to control for macroeconomic factors 
on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. Table 4.12 shows the results 
remain consistent in all equations.  
Table 4.12 Robustness check with the SYS-GMM estimator when controlling firm growth 
opportunity and macroeconomic factors 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q [lnQ] 
(1)  (2) 
Equation (3.3) 






































   

























































































Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 1,895 1,894 1,880 1,879 
Number of groups 412 412 412 412 
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F statistic F(26,411)=34.97 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(26,411)=39.65 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(26,411)=35.92 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(29,411)=34.05
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
Number of instruments 41 41 41 50 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.281 0.420 0.397 0.202 
Hansen-J test of over-
identification (p-value) 
0.380 0.543  0.660 0.972 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Following equations (3.3) to (3.6), firm growth opportunity measured by annual net sale growth 




Chapter 4 addresses the six research questions of the study. Employing the OLS, FE estimators and 
especially the SYS-GMM method allows me to address the dynamic endogeneity issue of the CG - firm 
performance relationship. This study shows that CG does impact the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms measured by Tobin’s Q.  
Specifically, board independence and board duality negatively influence Tobin’s Q of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms. Meanwhile, board size and board gender diversity are among the board structure 
variables which have no effects on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms.  
Regarding the impact of insider ownership on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms, this study finds both “convergence of interest and entrenchment hypotheses” of insider 
ownership. Specifically, the relationship between insider ownership and the financial performance is 
an inverted U-shape, which implies that the financial performance increases to a peak as insider 
ownership reaches 30% and then decreases with the  increase in insider ownership.  
This study also finds a cubic relationhip between ownership concentration and the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, thus the financial performance increases at low 
and high levels of ownership concentration and decreases at the intermediate level of ownership 
concentration. These results remain unchanged as I include insider and blockholder ownership in one 
unified model. Further, to check for the robustness of the empirical results, this study uses the 
alternative measure for profitability (ROA). Furthermore, I control for firm growth opportunities 
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measured by annual net sale growth (Growth) as the alternative for firm profitability, and include the 
inflation rate (Infl) to control for macroeconomic factors. The robustness check also produces 
consistent results of the relationship between the board structure as well as ownership structure 






Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of the study. Section 5.1 provides the main findings of the 
relationship between CG and the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. 
Section 5.2 discusses the study’s contributions to the CG literature. Section 5.3 presents the 
implications of the study for policymakers and Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. Section 5.4 
discusses the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research. Section 5.5 
summarises the chapter. 
5.1 Main findings of the study 
The present study examines the relationship between CG including board structure, insider 
ownership, and ownership concentration and the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms. This study employs board size, board gender diversity, board independence, board duality, 
insider ownership, and blockholder ownership to analyse their effects on the financial performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q  (the dependent variable). In addition, the study uses firm size, firm leverage, 
firm risk, firm profitability, number of insiders, firm age, industry dummies, and year dummies as the 
control variables. To examine the unbalanced panel data consisting of 2,322 firm-year observations of 
412 Vietnamese non-financial listed firms during 2010-2015, the study employs the SYS-GMM 
estimator as the main estimation technique to control for the “endogeneity problem”. Similarly, the 
traditional OLS and FE estimators are used for comparison purposes. After the endogeneity issue is 
controlled using the SYS-GMM estimator, the study finds that board size and board gender diversity 
have no relation with the firms’ performance, but board independence, board duality, insider 
ownership, and ownership concentration do impact the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms. 
5.1.1 Relationship between board structure and the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms 
This study focuses on examining the impacts of four major attributes of board structure including 
board size, board gender diversity, board independence, and board duality on the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms (objectives 1 to 4).   
The empirical result shows no statistically significant relationship between board size and the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, similar to the findings of Okiro (2006) and 
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Schultz et al., (2010). This means the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms 
does not depend on whether board size is large or small. Therefore, board size is not an efficient 
governance mechanism for Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. Similarly, consistent with Rose 
(2007), Smith, Smith, & Verner (2006), and Randoy et al., (2006), this study finds no evidence of the 
relation between a higher proportion of female members on the boardroom and better financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. Although in some countries such as the U.S 
(Erhardt et al., 2003; and Carter et al., 2003), Spain (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008), and Malaysia 
(Julizaerma & Sori, 2012), increasing the representation of female directors might improve the firms’ 
performance, thereby promoting good governance mechanisms, the appointment of more female 
directors to the board might not be an efficient governance mechanism for Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms. Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2008) suggest that the difference in estimation 
methodologies, sample timeline, and country context are among the reasons empirical results varied 
across studies. Although Vietnam has attained significant achievements in improving gender equality 
recently, its culture is still influenced by Confucian gender philosophies in which men are traditionally 
considered as being superior to women (Nguyen et al., 2015). Hence, the voices and contributions to 
the firms’ performance of female directors might be still limited. Therefore, a higher percentage of 
female members on boards is not necessarily associated with improved financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. 
The empirical result on the impact of “non-executive directors” on the BODs on the firms’ 
performance shows that a higher percentage of “non-executive members” negatively influences the 
financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. This result is similar to the findings of 
Ammari et al., (2014), Aroara & Sharma (2016), Adhikary & Le (2014), To (2011), and Dao & Hoang 
(2014). The improvement of board independence (Higgs Report, 2003; and Holmstrom & Kaplan, 
2003) facilitates the board decision-making, thereby enhancing the firms’ performance, but the 
effectiveness of this governance mechanism is subject to other underlying factors, such as the supply 
of “non-executive independent directors” or the approaches by which non-financial listed firms 
appoint their “non-executive directors”. Specifically, the effectiveness and independence of 
“independent directors” may become an issue hindering the improvement of the firms’ performance 
in many cases, such as the limited source of “independent directors” in developing countries (Aroara 
& Sharma, 2016; Nguyen et al., 2014), or the lack of finance-related expertise of independent directors 
(Park & Shin, 2004), or the appointment of “independent directors” due to political reasons or 
relationship consolidation instead of significant competence offered by independent directors 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), or the appointment of “outside directors” based on previously established 
relationships between the director candidates and CEOs or “insider directors” of the firms (Flanagan, 
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1982). The result is similar to Mak & Kusnady’s (2005) findings who recognise the importance of a 
governance structure that follows the CG code, but suggest that such a governance structure does not 
ensure its effectiveness in practice.   
Regarding the effects of board duality on the firms’ performance, the study supports the agency 
theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993) that the separation of the CEO and chairperson leads to 
the improved financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. The split of the CEO and 
chairman positions probably helps to limit the concentration of power in one person, which enables 
the CEOs to abuse their dominant power to pursue their own interests instead of maximising the firms’ 
wealth (Krause et al., 2013), or reduce the effectiveness of the monitoring function of the board over 
the CEOs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). In other words, “the separation of the CEO and 
chairman positions” formulates the “check and balance” system that works effectively for Vietnamese 
non-financial listed firms.  
5.1.2 Relationship between insider ownership and the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms  
Research objective 5 assesses the impacts of insider ownership on the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. The result shows that the relationship between insider 
ownership and the financial performance exhibits an inverted U-shape. Specifically, when insiders own 
less than 30% of the firms’ shares, insider ownership positively influences firm performance. As 
insiders’ proportion of shares is over 30%, insider ownership negatively impacts the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms.  
The inverted U-shaped relationship between insider ownership and the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms established in this study confirms the findings of Stulz (1998), 
McConnell & Seraes (1990), Hermalin & Weisbach (1991), and Han & Suk (1998). This result supports 
both “the convergence of interests and the entrenchment hypotheses” of insider ownership. At the 
low level of insider ownership, the interests of insiders are aligned with those of shareholders and of 
other stakeholders which drive the insiders to pursue the goal of maximizing firms’ values. 
Nevertheless, as the ownership of insiders is above a certain threshold point that enables the insiders 
to possess sufficient voting power, the insiders may prioritize themselves or become entrenched 
rather than following the best interests of the firms (Stulz, 1988; McConnell & Seraes, 1990; and Han 
& Suk, 1998). The result indicates that in a developing country like Vietnam where the legal and 
regulatory framework to protect “the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders” is at an early 
stage of development (IFC, 2011; World Bank, 2007), and the information asymmetry is of a high level 
(Jiang & Kim, 2004), the insiders who own a large proportion of shares may exploit their power and 
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firm specific information to pursue their own interests, thus resulting in a reduced firm performance. 
This is in line with the suggestion of Fama & Jensen (1983) that within the environment of high 
information asymmetry, managers are able to follow the objectives different from maximising firms’ 
values.   
5.1.3 Relationship between ownership concentration and the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms  
Regarding the effects of ownership concentration (measured by blockholder ownership) on the 
financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms (objective 6), the empirical result 
shows that the relation between ownership concentration and the financial performance is a cubic. 
Specifically, at a low level (less than 25%) and a high level of ownership concentration (more than 
61%), the firms’ financial performance is positively related to ownership concentration. However, at 
the middle level of ownership concentration (from 25% to 61%), the financial performance is 
negatively linked with ownership concentration.  
This empirical result shows the presence of both “convergence and expropriation effects of ownership 
concentration” on the non-financial firms’ performance, which confirms the findings of De Miguel et 
al., (2004) and Thomsen & Pedersen (2000). These studies document an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between ownership concentration and the non-financial firms’ performance, which 
implies the non-financial firms’ financial performance increases at a low level and decreases at a high 
level of ownership concentration. Interestingly, this study result shows the non-financial firms’ 
financial performance and ownership concentration form a cubic relation. This means when the non-
financial firms’ financial performance increases at a low level and decreases at a middle level of 
ownership concentration and when ownership concentration reaches to a certain point high enough 
(61%), the non-financial firms’ financial performance starts to increase again with the increase in 
ownership concentration.     
The convergence effect prevails at the low level of ownership concentration (less than 25%) as the 
benefits of blockholders and shareholders are related. Thus, the blockholders play an important role 
in supervising managers’ opportunistic behaviour, resulting in better non-financial firms’ 
performance. When blockholder ownership is over 25%, the expropriation effect prevails. The 
blockholders might act toward their own objectives and expropriate the benefits of minority 
shareholders, hence decreasing the non-financial firms’ performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Nevertheless, when the blockholders own a significant proportion of shares (61%), their interests and 
shareholders’ interests appear to be closely incorporated again, thus motivating them to play an active 
role in monitoring managers’ misconduct, and driving them to exploit all of their resources and 
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networks to maximise the firms’ values. In Vietnam, the State is still the blockholder or controlling 
shareholder in many previously State-owned firms (World Bank, 2013b). As the State is both the policy 
maker as well as the controlling shareholder of many firms, the high State-owned firms benefit from 
accessing development policies initiatives and orientations or unrevealed State’s strategies, and 
enjoying the special privilege or subsidy of the State, such as preferential loans from State banks that 
other firms cannot access. Hence, firms with large State ownership often have more advantages 
compared to other firms, which allows the high State-owned firms to outperform others. 
Furthermore, when ownership concentration is significant, the shares in public hands will be limited. 
In a newly established stock market like Vietnam, the prices of these stocks could be affected by “law 
of supply and demand”, which may lead to the rise in prices and higher Tobin’s Q of the stocks.
5.2 Contributions of the study to the governance literature 
The present study contributes to the CG literature in several ways. 
Firstly, this study is among the first studies that comprehensively examine the relationship between 
both board and ownership structures, two important features of CG, and the financial performance of 
non-financial listed firms in a developing country like Vietnam, where the stock market started 
operation in 2000 and the Code of CG applied to listed firms in 2007. Most of the previous research in 
the CG field is conducted in developed countries (i.e., the U.S, the UK and Europe). Compared to 
developing countries, these countries have several differences in macro and micro economic 
environments including the development of the stock market, institutional characteristics, ownership 
structrure, and culture. Therefore, it is necessary to re-examine the findings and implications of 
previous studies in the context of developing countries under communist regime such as Vietnam. 
This helps to answer the question of whether “one size fits all” CG mechanisim exists across countries 
with different institutional environment. 
Prior to this study, there has been a limited number of studies investigating the relationship between 
CG and the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no prior study that examines comprehensively the relationship between both 
board and ownership structures (including insider and blockholder ownership) and the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. This study, therefore contributes to the 
governance literature by enriching and expanding the understanding as well as the findings of the 
effects of CG features on financial performance in developing countries with a newly establised stock 
market and an early developed CG framework, such as Vietnam. 
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Secondly, employing the SYS-GMM method to examine the relationship between CG and firm 
performance to address the dynamic endogeneity problem, this study produces reliable outcomes of 
the impacts of the board and ownership structures on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms. It becomes more important when previous studies in Vietnam using the 
traditional OLS and FE estimation methods produce inconclusive results, probably due to 
inappropriate estimation techniques. As suggested by Wintoki et al., (2012), because of the dynamic 
relationship between CG and firm performance, studies that fail to control for the “dynamic 
endogeneity” when past performance influences both current performance and governance may 
produce “biased and inconsistent results”. As a result, the implications of the studies that fail to 
address the endogeneity issue may be inadequate and inefficient. To solve the “dynamic endogeneity 
problem”, Wintoki et al., (2012) recommend that the SYS-GMM estimator is the most appropriate 
estimation method in CG research. This is because the SYS-GMM estimator “can overcome the 
estimations problems introduced by unobservable heteroscedasticity, simultaneity, and dynamic 
endogeneity, and produce unbiased and consistent estimates by employing valid internal instruments 
during estimation” (Schultz et al., 2010, p.146). Wintoki et al., (2012, p.596) further emphasise that 
“the system GMM model enables us to estimate the governance/performance relation while including 
both past performance and fixed-effects to account for the dynamic aspects of the 
governance/performance relation and time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity, respectively”. 
Taking into consideration the importance of addressing the endogeneity problem, this study employs 
the SYS-GMM estimator to examine the relationship between CG and the financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. 
Thirdly, the present study sample is considerably larger than samples of previous studies using 
Vietnam data. Ammari et al., (2014, p.581) suggest that “the large sample data provides flexibility in 
using and reliably interpreting the results from different panel data estimation techniques including 
system GMM”. Previous studies that used a small sample size may not be able to produce more 
comprehensive and reliable outcomes (Nguyen et al., 2015). In addition, “the power of the 
specification tests is weaker in smaller samples” using the SYS-GMM estimator (Wintoki et al., 2012, 
p.591). Therefore, the large sample size of this study compared to the previous governance studies 
using Vietnam data allows me to conduct the specification tests with confidence, and generate more 
comprehensive and reliable outcomes through the estimation procedure.  
5.3 Implications 
The findings have several practical implications as follows. 
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The CG framework of Vietnamese listed firms is at an early  developmental stage (World Bank, 2007). 
The findings of the impacts of board structure on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms show that good CG practices (i.e, the more women or “non-executive directors” 
on the BODs) which have become sound governance mechanisms in several countries may be 
ineffective in Vietnam. This indicates that there is no “one size fits all” governance structure for all 
countries. Filatotchev, Jackson, & Nakajima (2013) suggest that the efficiency of CG mechanisms is 
influenced by institutional characteristics, such as the legal system, rule and regulation framework. 
Therefore, Vietnam’s policy makers should adopt good governance practices with comprehensive 
reforms in the related legal system, rule and regulation framework, shareholder and other stakeholder 
protection mechanisms, and administrative procedures. These legal reforms result in an improvement 
in Vietnam’s institutional characteristics, thereby facilitating the implementation of sound CG 
practices efficiently. In addition, policymakers should strengthen information disclosure regimes 
applied to board members, managers, and blockholders along with improved accounting and auditting 
standards to enhance transparency, lessen the information asymmetry, thereby reducing 
opportunistic behaviour of managers and officers of non-financial listed firms. Besides, the 
punishment of misconduct on information disclosure should be reinforced to discipline the stock 
market and the compliance with information disclosure regimes of non-financial listed firms. The 
equitisation process should also be accelerated to reduce “the presence of the State as a controlling 
shareholder” in non-financial listed firms, thereby building and developing a business environment in 
which all non-financial listed firms are equally treated. 
The study result shows that board size does not impact the financial performance of Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms. Each Vietnamese non-financial listed firm, hence, should decide the appropriate 
board size based on particular characteristics. Similarly, there is no significant evidence of any 
influence of greater board gender diversity on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms. This indicates that it is still too early to follow countries such as Norway, Germany, and 
Spain to consider legal changes that set mandatory quotas of female directors on the BODs of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. In addition, the study result suggests that the appointment of 
female members to the BODs should be encouraged to promote “gender equality” in Vietnam, rather 
than for improving the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. 
The study result shows that the separation between the CEO and chairman on the board leads to 
better financial performance of the Vietnamese non-financial listed firms, which means this is an 
effective CG mechanism to improve the firms’ performance. Therefore, Vietnamese non-financial 
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listed firms should consider separating these two titles following the encouragement of the CG Code 
(2012). 
The study result indicates the higher proportion of non-executives negatively affects the firms’ 
financial performance. This does not imply non-financial listed firms should not follow the governance 
practice to improve board independence by appointing non-executive or independent directors to 
their boards. This suggests that non-financial listed firms should be cautious when appointing non-
executives or independent directors by selecting competent and appropriate people to their boards 
to enhance board decision-making processes, thereby improving the firms’ performance. More 
importantly, policymakers should find possible solutions to increase the pool and quality of 
independent directors and director candidates to improve the manager labour market. Specifically, 
policymakers should consider establishing education centres to train and update in the latest 
development and expertise of good CG practices and securities market for directors, managers or 
director candidates to provide sufficient and qualified independent directors for Vietnamese non-
financial listed firms. 
Furthermore, the findings on the relationship between the board structure and the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms in this study confirm the “one size fits all” 
approach may not work effectively in Vietnam. Therefore, when considering the amendment or 
supplement of the CG Code in the future, policymakers should adopt a “comply or explain” approach. 
This provides Vietnamese non-financial listed firms with the flexibility in choosing either to comply 
with good CG principles of the Code or explain the reasons why they do not follow some principles. 
In addition, due to the high level of information asymmetry, a weak legal system and regulatory 
framework in Vietnam, ownership structure should be considered as “an effective CG mechanism” to 
mitigate “the agency problem” and to protect “minority shareholders and other stakeholders”. The 
result of the study shows the firms’ performance is maximised when insider ownership reaches 30%. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 reveal the average insider ownership in Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms is 10%, which means there is plenty of room to increase insider ownership to the optimal 
point of 30%. Therefore, non-financial listed firms should consider executive share-options to increase 
their proportion of shares to 30%. These schemes are designed to offer managers and senior officers 
of a firm the opportunities to purchase the firm’s shares at a preferential fixed price at a later time, 
thus helping to closely align the interests of managers with those of shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and providing incentives for managers to improve the firm’s performance. 
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5.4 Limitations and recomendations for future studies 
Like any studies, the present study does contain limitations. Many of these limitations may provide 
useful suggestions for subsequent research. 
This study only focuses on the impacts of four common features of board structure, including board 
size, board gender diversity, board independence, and board duality, on firms’ performance. However, 
there are other features of board structure that could influence firms’ performance, but not 
incorporated in our research framework. For examples, future studies may investigate the impacts of 
board committees (i.e, remuneration committee, audit committee, and nomination committee), 
board education, board experience, board age, board nationality on firms’ performance if the data is 
available.  
Regarding the ownership structure – firms’ performance relationship, this study examines the impacts 
of only insider and blockholder ownerships on the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial 
listed firms. However, state ownership, foreign ownership, institutional ownership and family 
ownership are also popular in Vietnam. Future research may explore the impacts of these types of 
ownership on firms’ performance in Vietnam.  
Apart from the impacts of board and ownership structures on firms’ financial performance, there are 
several governance features that may interest future researchers. For instance, the influence of board 
activities (i.e board meeting frequency) and board remuneration on firms’ performance could be 
possible governance features that subsequent studies could take into consideration to further 
investigate the relationship.   
Secondly, the board structure data in this study is obtained from relevant annual reports, financial 
reports and CG reports of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. In Vietnam, the stock market is newly 
established and as the rules and regulations for the stock market’s operation are recently issued and 
gradually developed, many non-financial listed firms fail to sufficiently disclose these reports. The non-
financial listed firms chosen for this study might probably be the firms with higher levels of 
transparency, management and efficiency, which possibly cause sample selection bias (Nguyen et al., 
2015).  
Thirdly, due to the unavailability of the data of the Vietnam stock market before 2010, this study uses 
the data only from 2010 to 2015. A longer time series study would probably facilitate analysing the 
relationship between CG and firm performance in a more inclusive manner. In addition, Wintoki et al., 
(2012, p.591) suggest that board structure variables are highly persistent which “reduces the power 
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of any data estimator”. To address this issue, Wintoki et al., (2012) propose using “two-year interval 
data” instead of annual data, which would help to mitigate serial correlation of the error term. 
However, adopting two-year intervals is impossible for this study since I employ the data of only six 
years. Hence, to solve the issue of the highly persistent nature of governance variables, future studies 
could extend the study period using yearly data or two-year interval data. 
Fourthly, the scope of the present study is the CG – financial performance relationship of only 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. Thus, the study’s outcomes might be valid within Vietnamese 
non-financial listed firms. Black, De Carvalho, Khanna, Kim, & Yurtoglu (2014) suggest that single-
country studies enable deep analysis but probably lack generalisability. Therefore, generalisation of 
this study’s results should be cautious. Thus, future studies could consider including additional 
countries in the dataset. 
This study employs Tobin’s Q as a “market-based measure” for firm financial performance of 
Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. The “market-based measure” such as Tobin’s Q enables 
researchers to overcome possible measurement errors arised from firm specific reporting errors or 
possible managerial manipulation as discussed in Chapter 3. Although Tobin’s Q is recognised as “the 
most commonly used measure” of firm financial performance in the research world (Al-Matari et al.,  
2014; Nguyen et al., 2014), like any other measures, Tobin’s Q is also subject to measurement errors. 
These measurement errors may derive from its approximately constructed equation (Knock et al., 
1991), or the possibility that Tobin’s Q may not be perfect to reflect the relationships the study 
investigates (Nguyen et al., 2014). Therefore, future research may consider other measures of 
financial performance, such as stock returns, or returns and revenues on employees ratios when the 
data (such as dividend ratio and the number of employees) is available. 
Lastly, this study focuses on non-financial listed firms in the two stock exchanges of Vietnam. It is a 
common practice to exclude the financial and banking sectors from the sample because of the 
differences in operational activities, CG regulations and accounting standards between the financial 
and banking sectors and other sectors (Adams & Mehran, 2011; Fama & French, 1992; Yermark, 1996; 
Rose, 2007; and Schultz et al., 2010). However, there is a shortage of research examining CG issues in 
the financial and banking sectors in Vietnam. It becomes more important as many listed banks are 
previously state owned banks with large capitalisation and they play a very important role in Vietnam’s 
economy (World Bank, 2013b). Issues on CG, including the CG - firm performance relationship in the 
financial and banking sectors should be taken into consideration in future research. Furthermore, in 
Vietnam, there is another stock market named UPCOM which provides the platform for trading the 
stocks of unlisted firms. Although UPCOM is newly established in 2009, this stock market has 
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developed rapidly in terms of the number of listed firms and market capitalisation. Specifically, at the 
end of 2017, UPCOM is the trading platform for the stocks of 700 firms with a market capitalisation of 
719.45 trillion VND8 and most of them are young or newly equitised state owned firms. Since the data 
of this market is limited, there is a lack of studies investigating CG issues of UPCOM’s firms. Future 
research could explore CG issues of this market as more data becomes available.  
5.5 Summary 
This chapter provides the summary, contributions and implications of the findings of this study. The 
study investigates the relationship between both board and ownership structures and the financial 
performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. The study finds that except for board size and 
board gender diversity which have no effects on the firms’ performance, the other governance 
attributes do impact the financial performance of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms. Specifically, 
board independence and board duality negatively affect the firms’ performance; the relationship 
between insider ownership and the firms’ performance is an inverted U-shape, while that between 
ownership concentration and the firms’ performance is cubic. These results support the suggestion 
that the effectiveness of a governance structure is influenced by the institutional characteristics in 
which the firms operate. 
The study contributes to the extant governance literature in several ways: employing the most robust 
techniques (the SYS-GMM estimator) to control for the “endogeneity issue”; broadening the 
understanding of the impacts of both board and ownership structures on the performance of non-
financial listed firms in a communist developing country like Vietnam where the stock market and 
governance framework are recently established; providing more reliable pre-estimation tests’ results, 
and generating more comprehensive estimations’ outcomes based on a larger data sample with 412 
non-financial listed firms and 2,322 firm-year observations compared to previous governance studies 
based on Vietnamese data. This study also provides several important implications for policymakers 
and non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. 
Like any studies, this study contains some limitations (i.e, short time series, limited generalisability by 
using a single-country dataset, and only non-financial listed firms in the dataset). Future research 
could extend the time-series period and include additional countries in the dataset. In addition, the 
governance issues of the financial and banking sectors and UPCOM’s firms and more CG features could 
be taken into consideration in future studies.  
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